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Abstract 
Revonsuo's Threat Simulation Theory of dreaming asserts that dreaming was selected 
during human evolution because it has the adaptive function of providing a threat-free 
context in which threat perception and avoidance can be rehearsed. This study aimed to 
test the prediction that the threat simulation mechanism will activate differently 
depending on waking exposure to ecologically valid threat cues. It also compared the 
impact of waking threat events on dream content with that of waking positive events, as 
TST asserts that only threat impacts on dream content. Data was collected from three 
contexts: a high threat context (the Western Cape in South Africa; n 208); a medium 
threat context (a black southern university in the US; n = 34); and a low threat context 
(North Wales; n 116). Questionnaires included a Most Recent Dream report, details of 
exposure to waking threatening and positive events, and dreams of such events. Chi-
square analysis indicated the groups differed significantly in terms of recent exposure to 
an ancestral type life-threatening event (X2[2,N=208j = 17.25, P < 0.0002). However, the 
differential activation predicted by Revonsuo for the different threat contexts did not 
occur: participants in the low threat context reported significantly more realistic physical 
threats in dreams (x,2[2,N=314] 6.18; p < 0.0455); and dream life-threats and escapes from 
threats were equally low in all contexts. It was also found that most participants did not 
report dreaming of actual recent life-threatening experiences; and those who did, tended 
not to escape the dream threat. Ancestral life-threatening experiences were no more 
likely to lead to dream simulations than modem life-threatening experiences (x,2[1,N=104) = 
0.808, p < 0.3687). Furthermore, as many people reported dreaming of positive waking 
events as reported dreaming of actual life-threatening events (X2[l,N=389j = 0.17, P < 
0.6772), and these dreams were also reported to have recurred. The mean estimates of 
recurrence for dreams subsequent to actual life-threatening events were similar to those 
for dreams subsequent to positive events. These results contradict TST s predictions, and 
cast doubt on the validity of the theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 2000, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, the most influential journal in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience, published a special issue on sleep and dreaming. It contained the 
most important recent research and theorizing on dreaming, along with extensive peer 
commentary. This issue was later reprinted in book form by Cambridge University Press, 
and updates on relevant subsequent research findings were included (Pace-Shott, Solms, 
Blagrove & Hamad, 2003). Revonsuo's Threat Simulation Theory (TST) was presented 
as one of five target articles. TST asserts that dreaming was specifically selected during 
human evolution. The theory postulates that dreaming has the biologically adaptive 
function of providing a cost-free context in which threat perception and avoidance can be 
rehearsed, thus improving waking performance. 
TST drew a mixed response from the BBS commentators. The theory seems highly 
speculative, and the bases of Revonsuo's arguments are perhaps somewhat shaky. Aside 
from a study by Revonsuo and Valli (2000), very little attention has since been paid to 
testing the theory, although it continues to be cited. This is problematic, because as 
Domhoff (2003a) has pointed out, the field of dream research contains many speculative 
theories. Despite having no empirical evidence in their favour, they persist because they 
are difficult to refute. The aim of this study is thus to investigate the plausibility of some 
of Tsr s assertions. 
TST is very detailed, and incorporates a great deal of evidence from widely disparate 
sources. It will initially be presented in brief and without comment, as first put forward 
by Revonsuo (2000a). 
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Revonsuo's Threat Simulation Theory 
In the initial exposition of the theory, Revonsuo contends that the appropriate context for 
considering any possible biological function for dreaming is that of human evolution in 
the Pleistocene era. His stated aim is to explain dreaming at the phenomenal level, 
attempting to ascertain whether the subjective conscious experience of dreaming could be 
functional. Functional means biologically adaptive, hence dreaming must have provided 
a selective advantage, which led to its propagation in the population. Revonsuo adds the 
caveat that whatever function dreaming may have served in the ancestral past, we need 
not expect it to be retained in our current, vastly different environment. He includes 
multidisciplinary evidence from the areas of content analysis~ neurophysiology and 
evolutionary psychology, but because he accepts that REM and dreaming are dissociable, 
Revonsuo argues that explanations of dreaming need not refer to REM or any 
physiological sleep processes. The resultant Threat Simulation Theory (TST) is 
expressed in 6 propositions, each of which is followed by specific predictions. 
Proposition 1: "Dream experience is not random or disorganized; instead it constitutes 
an organized and selective simulation of the perceptual world" (p.SS2) 
Revonsuo argues that dream content shows too much organization to have arisen by 
chance. 
"The dreaming brain constructs a complex, organized offline model of the world in which there 
typically is an active dream self with a body-image much like the one we experience when awake, 
surrounded by a vi suo-spatial world of objects, people, and animals, participating in a multitude of 
events and social interactions with other dream characters" (Revonsuo, 2000, p.883). 
Revonsuo argues that if dreams were simply due to random activation, as originally 
suggested by Hobson (Hobson & McCarley, 1977), they should be experienced as static 
images; or as weird visuals like the aura of a migraine, and not as a complex world 
model. He refers to Penfield's experiments (as discussed in Penfield, 1975), where 
stimulation of the temporal cortex resulted in vivid and realistic perceptual flashbacks. 
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Revonsuo claims these were dissimilar to dreams, being short and unelaborated. He also 
cites Foulkes' (1985) characterization of dreams as coherently organized, and claims they 
take the same general form as our waking experience. Revonsuo argues that, given the 
perfection of the simulation, there is no reason for us not to believe that the dream 
experience is entirely real. 
Regarding selectivity, Revonsuo refers to Hartmann's (1998) findings, which indicate the 
three R's (reading, writing and arithmetic) are absent from dream content. He concludes 
that dreaming is selective in what it represents. 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 1: 
1) The neural mechanisms underlying dream production are selective and organized, 
not random. 
2) Threat simulations are not randomly generated, but originate in episodic memory 
traces in the amygdala-centered emotional memory system, and are systematically 
modulated by an associated negative emotional charge. 
Proposition 2: "Dream experience is specialized in the simulation of threatening 
events" (p.883) 
Revonsuo claims this proposition is supported by evidence of more negative than positive 
elements in dream content: 
• Negative emotions prevail in dreams. A study by Snyder (1970) found a majority 
(2/3rds) of negative emotions, the most common being fear. According to the Hall 
and Van de Castle norms (in Domhoff, 1996), about 50% of negative dream 
emotions are apprehension; the other half being coded as sadness, anger, and 
confusion. 
• Misfortunes occur 7 times more frequently than good fortune (Hall & Van de 
Castle, 1966, in Domhoff, 1996). 
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• Aggression is the most frequent social interaction and occurs in 45% of dreams 
(Hall & Van de Castle, 1966, in Domhoff, 1996); the dreamer is involved in 80% 
of these interactions, and is more often the victim than the aggressor. 
Revonsuo goes on to argue that dream content is not only predominantly negative, it is 
also consistent with our ancestral rather than our current environment. 
• Enemies in dreams: Animals and male strangers are the most common enemies in 
dream reports (Domhoff, 1996). Revonsuo also argues that this, and the frequent 
occurrence of running away and hiding, indicate the presence of ancestral threat 
avoidance scripts in dreams. 
• Children's dreams: Revonsuo claims that if his hypothesis is true, we should 
expect to find more aggressions and animals in dreams earlier in life, before the 
brain has adjusted to the non-ancestral environment. Research indicates that there 
are more animal characters in children's dreams; comprising 25 - 30% of all 
characters in two to six year olds; 15% in seven to twelve year olds; and only 5% 
in adult dream reports (Hall & Domhoff, 1963; 1964). Many studies confirm this 
trend. Moreover, Revonsuo claims that wild or frightening animals constitute 40% 
of these dream animals. (See Revonsuo, 2000a, for a review of this literature). 
• Recurrent dreams and nightmares: The most common recurrent dream theme is 
of being chased. Being chased or attacked is also the most common nightmare 
theme (Domhoff, 1996; Feldman & Hersen, 1967; Hartmann, 1984). 
• Absence of the three R's: Hartmann (1998) indicated that these activities are 
underrepresented in dream reports. Revonsuo argues that this is not simply 
because they have little emotional significance: other activities which vary in 
terms of emotional intensity and relevance nonetheless occur as frequently in 
dreams as in waking (i.e. walking, talking with friends, and sexual activity; 
Hartmann, 1998). Revonsuo concludes that the three R's are absent because they 
did not exist in our ancestral environment. 
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He then proposes that the activation patterns of REM reflect the neural correlates of 
threat simulation. He refers to recent memory research which posits 2 memory systems: 
a 'hot', amygdala centered emotional system; and a 'cool', hippocampally centered 
episodic system (Revonsuo cites Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998, for a review of this literature). 
It is proposed that the 'hot' system highlights highly emotional species-specific or 
learned memory traces. This system is thought to be more primitive and automatic than 
the 'cool' system, and is involved in releasing rapid species-specific responses such as 
fear and defensive behavior. Revonsuo concludes: 
"neurophysiological studies and functional brain imaging reveal the dream-production 
mechanisms at work during REM sleep, searching for and processing emotionally charged 
memory traces in the evolutionarily ancient, 'hot' memory system." (p.887). 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 2: 
1) If we define a content category that includes all threatening events, these should 
be over-represented in dreams. 
2) Severe or mortally dangerous threats should occur more frequently in dreams than 
in waking life. 
3) When activated by real threats, the threat simulation mechanism should simulate 
ancestral threats (e.g. animal attacks, direct physical aggression, natural forces) 
more efficiently than modem threats (e.g. smoking, traffic accidents, explosives) 
Proposition 3: "Encountering real threats during waking has a powerfuL effect on 
subsequent dream content: real threats activate the threat simulation system in a 
qualitatively unique manner, dissimilar from the effects on dreaming of any other 
experience" (p.887) 
• Traumatic experience impacts on dream content: The literature indicates that 
trauma commonly leads to nightmares (Nader, 1996; Wilmer, 1996). Revonsuo 
argues that this fact is impressive, given the difficulty encountered in laboratory 
studies attempting to influence dream content. 
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"The sense of severe personal threat probably is the most powerful factor we know of in 
the modulation of the content of dreams: the experience of a severe trauma can induce 
nightmares in almost anyone; the majority of people, especially children, involved in 
traumatic events do report nightmares ... " (p.887) 
• Real threats are cues that activate the threat simulation system: Real threats 
constitute the only ecologically valid cues for triggering the threat simulation 
mechanism. Revonsuo dismisses the idea that strong positive emotions may also 
impact on dreams, citing Hartmann's (1998) contention that even positive events 
are dreamed about in terms of possible problems/threats. 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 3: 
I) No other class of event will be found that impacts on dream content in the same 
manner as the experience of threatening events. 
2) Real threats will activate the threat simulation mechanism universally, independent 
of culture. 
3) The intensity (i.e. frequency and persistence) of simulations triggered by an actual 
threat will depend on the degree of personal threat experienced. 
Proposition 4: "The threat simulations are perceptually and behaviorally realistic 
and therefore efficient rehearsals of threat perception and threat-avoidance 
responses" (p.889). 
• Perceptual realism and lack of insight: Revonsuo argues that because these 
factors are present, the simulation is taken seriously as real. 
• Motor Realism: Dream imagery uses the same motor circuits that generate actual 
movement. When motor inhibition mechanisms fail, the result is REM Sleep 
Behavior Disorder, where violent behaviors can occur in REM sleep. Complex 
behaviors can manifest in REM without atonia: in cats we see searching for and 
orienting toward prey; as well as attack behavior (Morrison, 1983). From this 
Revonsuo concludes that" ... threat simulation during sleep includes realistic and 
adequate motor activation in the brain in response to the perceived threats" 
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(p.890). He also argues that the theta rhythm present in REM is crucial to survival 
in waking it is linked to predatory behavior in the cat and to prey behavior in 
rabbit (Winson, 1990). 
"Thus, to dream about threat perception and threat-avoidance behaviors is to realistically 
rehearse these functions in a safe environment" (Revonsuo, 2000a, p.890) 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 4: 
1) In the face oflife-threatening dream events, the dreamer is most likely to react 
in a reasonable and realistic defensive manner. 
2) The neural correlates of visual awareness will be found to be the same in 
dreaming as in waking. 
3) Without atonia, all the movements experienced in the dream will be carried 
out by the dreamer's physical body. 
Proposition 5: "Simulation of perceptual and motor skills leads to enhanced 
performance in corresponding real situations even if the rehearsal episodes were 
not explicitly remembered" (p.890) 
• Mental training: Motor imagery and mental training leads to increased muscle 
strength; learning new motor skills; and improved sports performance (Hall, 
Bukolz & Fishburne, 1992; Lejune, Decker & Sanchez, 1994; Yue & Cole 1992). 
Revonsuo thus hypothesizes that dream rehearsals could result in similar 
improvements. In the waking training situations, however, we explicitly 
remember the content, which is not the case with most dreams. Revonsuo thus 
invokes implicit learning and memory to explain the advantage dream rehearsals 
may convey. 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 5: 
1) Simulations involve behavior that requires perceptual, cognitive and motor skills 
that improve through implicit procedural learning. 
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2) Implicit learning in waking amnesic patients should form a model for implicit 
learning for normal subjects during dreaming. 
Proposition 6: "The original environment in which humans and their ancestors have 
lived for more than 99% of human evolutionary history included frequent dangerous 
events that threatened human reproductive success and presented severe selection 
pressures on ancestral human populations. The ecologically valid threat cues in the 
human ancestral environment fully activated the threat simulation system. Recurring, 
realistic threat simulations led to improved threat perception and avoidance skills and 
therefore increased the probability of successful reproduction of any given individual 
Consequently, the threat-simulation system was selected for during our evolutionary 
history" (p.891). 
Revonsuo argues that the ancestral environment was extremely harsh and contained 
threats such as predation, exposure, disease, risks in hunting, and intergroup aggression. 
These ecologically valid cues would have resulted in the threat simulation mechanism 
being constantly activated. "In effect the dream production system must have been in a 
more-or-Jess constant post-traumatic state" (2000a, p.891). 
Revonsuo argues that if the threat simulation mechanism exists, we should expect it to be 
activated in present day hunter-gatherer populations because their living conditions are 
similar to ancestral ones. We should predict frequent threat simulations and many animal 
characters in their dreams. He claims that this prediction is born out in published studies 
(Domhoff, 1996; Gregor, 1981). 
Predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 6: 
1) Children old enough to use threat recognition and avoidance skills will be capable 
of threat simulations in dreams if exposed to ecologically valid threats. 
2) Ontogenically early exposure to experienced real (ancestral) threats will stimulate 
the threat simulation system, leading to earlier, more frequent, and more intensive 
threat simulations, lasting throughout life. Conversely, if there is no exposure to 
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real threats, the dream production system will develop more slowly or stay in a 
resting state and threat simulations will remain less frequent and milder. 
Revonsuo's model of dream production and threat simulation 
Revonsuo asserts that dream production is a hardwired feature of brain function, which 
has two distinct stages: 
1) Threat recognition: salient emotionally charged memory traces are selected; and 
the selected visual imagery is realized by the occipito-temporal visual stream. 
When the threat is present in visual consciousness, the amygdala is activated to 
evaluate it as rapidly as possible. 
2) Threat avoidance: this involves the rapid selection of an appropriate response 
(e.g. fleeing, hiding, defending, attacking) and the immediate realization of this 
response. Dream production mechanisms tend to use ancestral scripts: Le. 
attacks, fights, pursuits, escapes, intrusions, loss of resources; dream self or kin 
being threatened. 
"Threat avoidance simulation primes the connections between specific perceptual-
emotional content and specific behavioral responses, and rehearses the efficient release of 
these behavioral responses through the activation of cortical motor programs" (Revonsuo, 
2000a, p.894). 
Revonsuo concludes that this mechanism is biologically functional. 
Mechanisms behind post-traumatic nightmares 
Revonsuo argues that memory traces with an overwhelming emotional charge may 
remain highly salient, and thus keep getting selected. Constant dream rehearsal may 
contribute to this process. He points out that we should not expect these dreams to be 
adaptive in war-related PTSD the conditions resulting in PTSD are too different from 
the ancestral environment. 
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Why we dream about 'current concerns' 
When no threats are present in waking life, any recent or active memory traces may be 
selected; particularly those that are emotionally charged. Hence we dream about 'current 
concerns'. TST, however, predicts dreams can be disconnected from current concerns: 
nightmares and recurrent dreams are not always prompted by actual events. These dreams 
are generated from ancestral threat scripts. The current concerns theory cannot explain 
these dreams and Revonsuo concludes that TST is more parsimonious as it can explain 
both types of dreams with one mechanism. 
Threat simulation as a biological defense mechanism 
Revonsuo likens the threat simulation mechanism to the immune system: both aim to 
protect the individual. Like the immune system, the threat simulation mechanism is 
activated by the presence of threat; and is deactivated once the threat is eliminated. 
Critically, it remembers the response to any particular threat in future, resulting in a better 
response. 
Revonsuo contends that our non-threat dreams have no function. They are produced in 
the same way that the immune system produces granulocytes in the absence of pathogens. 
He also points out that our immune system has elements which appear to be 
nonfunctional or dysfunctional. He argues that nightmares and PTSD should be seen in 
this perspective: allergies and autoimmune diseases occur, and both can be fatal. 
Nonetheless the immune mechanism was selected because it produces more benefits than 
costs overall. 
RESPONSES TO TST 
Thirty-six authors provided detailed peer commentary on Revonsuo's target article. It is 
clearly impossible for this review to give adequate coverage of all these responses. The 
following constitutes a brief overview of both positive responses to TST, and of some of 
the most telling criticisms presented. Following each criticism a brief synopsis of 
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Revonsuo's response, if any, will be included. An analysis of his response will also be 
attempted. 
Positive responses to TST 
Many commentators welcomed Revonsuo's evolutionary approach to investigating the 
possibility of dreams being functional, even if not all accepted TST (Antrobus, 2000; 
Ardito, 2000; Bednar, 2000; Cheyne, 2000; Conduit, Crewther & Coleman, 2000; 
Humphrey, 2000; Kramer, 2000; Kriekhaus, 2000; Montangero, 2000; Moorcroft, 2000; 
Panksepp, 2000; Rotenberg, 2000; Shackelford & Weekes-Shackelford, 2000; 
Thompson, 2000; Wichlinski, 2000). 
Gottesmann (2000) sees a link between Revonsuo's concept of ancestral scripts and 
Freud's idea of phylogenetically transmitted primal fantasies. He cites the dream 'The 
man and the wolves' as a paradigm of threat simulation. Shackelford and Weekes-
Shackelford (2000) accept TST wholeheartedly, and suggest looking for gender 
differences in threat simulations, as women and men faced different selection pressures. 
Cheyne (2000) draws attention to the similarity of dreams to play - both allow simulation 
of unusual and exaggerated actions or situations; while dreaming has an even greater 
advantage than play in providing a safe context for the simulation. Humphrey (2000) 
also notes this analogy, but nonetheless thinks TST is too narrow: play does not only 
simulate dangerous situations, but contributes to social and psychological development. 
He argues we should expect the same function for dreams. 
Domhoff (2000) does not think that dreams are adaptive, but he does agree that repetitive 
dreams may be linked to the fear/vigilance system of the amygdala. Kriekhaus (2000), 
on the other hand, agrees that dreaming of threat would bestow great selective advantage, 
but argues that the focus should move away from the amygdala to the Papez circuit, 
which mediates explicit learning. He, however, points out that as this system is present in 
all mammals, TST is not likely to be specific to humans. Panksepp (2000) applauds 
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Revonsuo's acknowledgement of the importance of emotion in dreams, but argues that 
we should examine all basic emotion systems, not just fear. 
Wichlinksi (2000) also applauds TST, and examines related pharmacological data. He 
says that although the evidence is tentative and there are some contradictions, there are 
some consistencies with TST. Generally, pharmacological suppression of REM leads to 
a reduction in nightmares, while REM enhancement results in an increase in bad dreams. 
The conclusion Revonsuo (2000b) draws from this is that REM suppression/enhancement 
correlates with the activity level of the threat simulation mechanism. 
Criticisms of TST 
Criticisms based on dream research methods 
The report :f the dream: 
This is a fundamental constraint on all dream research, and one which is often ignored. 
The actual dream cannot be accessed, and it is impossible to verify the accuracy of dream 
reporting (Coenen, 2000). An extreme position contends we cannot exclude the 
possibility that nothing exists but the report (Feinberg, 2000; Thompson, 2000). Hobson 
Pace-Shott and Stickgold (2000a) suggest that because the report is generated in the 
waking state, waking phenomenology is likely to be confused with dreaming 
phenomenology, obscuring important differences in experience across the two states. 
Nonetheless, most theoretical models of dreaming, including Revonsuo's, are built on the 
assumption that dream reports provide a valid sample of cognitive activity during sleep 
(Conduit et at, 2000). Coenen (2000) questions whether dream reports are a reliable 
enough reflection of actual dream experience to justify this. Given the disagreement 
around dream experience in terms of the location and character of complex sleep 
mentation (Antrobus, 1983; 2000; Foulkes, 1962; Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983; Hobson et 
aI., 2000a; Nielsen, 1998; 2000a; Solms, 1997; 2000; Zimmerman, 1970), Revonsuo's 
implicit assumption that dreams REM-type or 'apex' dreams (Nielsen, 2000a), and that 
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dream reports unproblematic ally reflect these dreams, is one that is open to challenge. 
He, however, ignores the existence of this problem entirely. 
Failing to problematize recall of dreams is another major oversight. The fact that dreams 
are so easily forgotten is one that any theory of dreaming should attempt to explain 
(Hobson et aI., 2000a). Lehman and Koukkou (2000) argue that dream recall is 
problematic due to state differences: optimal recall occurs in the same state as the initial 
expenence. Hobson et al (2000a) postulate a state dependent amnesia: aminergic 
activation falls by 50% in NREM, and by almost 100% in REM thus they suggest that 
for recall to occur, the intense activation of REM must overcome this and persist into 
waking. It is for this reason that very vivid dreams tend to be recalled. This intense 
activation argument could hold equally for recall of dreams from sleep onset and late 
stage NREM. Braun (1999) has indicated that prefrontal deactivation in REM degrades 
working memory - dream memory traces become relatively inaccessible because they are 
not linked to simultaneously encoded contextual cues. 
Both these concerns - the inaccessibility of the actual dream experience combined with 
poor recall - need to be acknowledged and addressed by any theory that aims to establish 
an understanding of dreaming. It should be noted that Revonsuo assumes a one-to-one 
relationship between dreams and reports. He justifies this by claiming that laboratory and 
dream content studies should give a clear idea of dream content, and "if this is not the 
case, then the content of dreams must be beyond the reach of systematic empirical 
investigation" (Revonsuo, 2000b, p.1067). This response does not address the chief 
concern: if systematic recall biases exist, due to different sleep states and the transition 
from sleep to waking, they will impact on findings in all contexts. This possibility must 
at least be acknowledged. 
Selective bias in memory for dreams: 
Clearly the possibility exists that selective bias operates in the recall of dreams. 
Chapman and Underwood (2000) are researching a waking memory phenomenon which 
may be related to dream recall biases. They propose that recall of internal mental events 
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s to an existing external narrative. During routine tasks 
vander, and the authors find that if interrupted, people 
I Thoughts (TUITs), which become inaccessible after a 
:essibility is due to a lack of retrieval cues. Similarly in 
lmediately linked to an external narrative. Thus it is 
\rdest to recall are those which have no link to external 
recall follows the rules of classical memory theory: 
msity are predictive of recall ability. Schredl (2000) 
Ha,:) ::Hlown that dreams recalled immediately on awakening show a balance of positive 
and negative affect, while delayed recall yields a preponderance of negative emotion. 
Mealey (2000) states that comparing REM awakening reports, dream diary entries and 
delayed free recall shows the least interesting and emotional dreams are forgotten first, 
until only the most salient dreams remain in memory. She argues that reports of salient 
dreams are thus likely to form the bulk of content research studies: a highly selective and 
unrepresentative sample. Conduit et al. (2000) agree, claiming that memory research has 
shown that emotional and unusual events attract attention and are thus more easily 
recalled. A majority of emotional and unusual content in dream reports may simply 
reflect these biases in memory processes. 
It is thus possible that dream recall follows biases evident in waking cognition. Mealey 
(2000) points out that a variety of threat-related cognitive biases have been demonstrated, 
with survival related threats being selectively perceived, attended to, remembered and 
discussed. Bednar (2000) concurs, as do Chapman and Underwood (2000), who state: 
"Two key factors that determine the likelihood of events being represented in memory 
are precisely the degree of threat posed and the unpleasantness of the 
incident. .. Unpleasant, traumatic events are routinely over-represented in memory" 
(p.918). Conduit et al. (2000) dismiss Revonsuo's argument as follows: 
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"all of the events we dream about must have an origin in memory, Therefore, it is the selective 
nature of attention and memory consolidation during waking that can provide an explanation for 
the proposed oveHepresentation of "threatening" dream content, rather than a biased dream 
generation mechanism" (Conduit et aI., 2000, p.927). 
We may thus have a systematically biased sample of dream content: as Montangero 
(2000) argues, everyone can recall a nightmare, but most people are unaware of mundane 
dreams that occur throughout the night. Subject selection may be an issue too - Nielsen 
(2000b) points out that sufferers of nightmares and other parasomnias may be more 
inclined to volunteer for sleep studies. Domhoff (1996) strongly defends the validity of 
certain content research, pointing out that arbitrary cues throughout waking can cue recall 
of dream events. However, even he concedes that some dreams may be more easily 
forgotten, and that there does seem to be a recall bias in favor of dramatic dreams. Aside 
from the comments already cited, Revonsuo makes no response to criticisms based on 
problems inherent in dream research methodology. 
Criticisms based on conflicting evidence 
Threat Simulation Theory is too narrow: 
Montangero (2000) makes the point that TST is too narrow, calling it conjectural, and 
asserting it cannot explain the majority of our dreams. Similarly, Cheyne (2000) 
questions the contention that only a proportion of dreams have evolutionary significance 
while the rest reflect random error, commenting: "If the remainder of dreams were an 
undifferentiated morass, perhaps the narrowness of the threat simulation hypothesis 
would be less problematic" (p.918). This, however, is not the case. It is well established 
that there are other common and consistently occurring dream themes. Bednar (2000) 
states that assuming these are simply side-effects seems arbitrary, and accuses Revonsuo 
of not treating dream content systematically. 
Germain, Nielsen, Zadra and Montplaisir (2000) have studied the prevalence of dream 
themes in over 1000 students and nearly 1000 sleep-disordered individuals. They 
confirm Revonsuo' s contention that chase dreams are very common, ranking among the 
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three most prevalent themes. However, they find some of the most prevalent themes are 
positive, for example sex and flying. Also, many prevalent themes are of current rather 
than ancestral concerns, for example, schoolwork. For students, 'school, teachers and 
studying' ranks 3cd most prevalent Importantly, many ancestral themes rank among the 
least prevalent. Natural disasters are not common: fire ranks 33rd, tornados or gales 45th 
and earthquakes 48th. Very interestingly, in terms of Revonsuo's argument concerning 
enemies in our dreams, threatening animals rank 35th and wild violent beasts rank 40th. 
Zadra and Donderi (2000a) analyzed recurrent dream content, and argue against 
Revonsuo's use ofthese dreams as exemplars of the threat simulation mechanism. They 
point out that many recurrent dreams do not contain threats~ threats in recurrent dreams 
are not always realistic; and that successful threat avoidance rarely occurs. Additionally, 
research indicates recurrent dreams are associated with a deficit in psychological health. 
This seems counter to Revonsuo's contention that the threat simulation mechanism is 
adaptive. 
Zadra and Donderi (2000a) agree that chase dreams are the most frequently reported 
recurrent dreams. Nonetheless, they constitute less than 15% of adult recurrent dreams. 
They find 30% of recurrent dreams to be idiosyncratic, and unrelated to threats; with 
consistent themes such as house maintenance; finding new rooms; losing one's teeth; and 
driving occurring in the remainder. They conclude: 
"Based on the range of thematic content and affective expression represented in recurrent dreams, 
it may be misleading to conclude that most recurrent dreams are dissociated from the dreamer's 
current concerns. It would appear that a great many recurrent dreams are not realistic rehearsals of 
a threatening event but rather pictorial metaphors of current concerns" (Zadra & Donderi, 2000a, 
p.l018). 
Other criticisms of the focus on threat also arose. Kramer (2000) points out that familiar 
characters are more frequently incorporated into dreams than strangers, which is not what 
would be expected from the threat simulation mechanism. Ardito (2000) argues that the 
prevalence of negative emotions does not necessarily support the threat simulation 
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hypothesis. Negative emotions are varied. and many have no relation to threat. Other 
research (Strauch & Meier, 1996) shows the most common specific emotion in dreams 
may be joy. Ardito (2000) also argues against using prevalence of misfortunes as 
supporting evidence: these events are usually inevitable or uncontrollable, so it is hard to 
see how dreams could lead to more adaptive response. Flanagan (2000) contends that the 
prevalence of animal characters in children's dreams can be explained by their constant 
exposure to fairy tales and cartoons. 
Nielsen and Germain (2000) point out that "the observation that interactive character 
imagery is virtually universal to dreaming could lead forthright to a theory of dreaming as 
simulation of attachment relationships" (p.979) - these are also fundamental to survival. 
Similarly, the constant occurrence of self-imagery in dreams could suggest a theory of 
dreaming as vital to ego and self-state development. The consistency of place imagery 
could suggest dreaming is involved in spatial learning and orientation. They are 
suggesting that Revonsuo's narrow focus on one aspect of dream content is arbitrary. 
Revonsuo 's response (2000b): 
Revonsuo did not directly address all the criticisms mentioned above. In response to 
Flanagan's contention that the source of pervasive animal characters in children's dreams 
could be exposure to fairy tales and cartoons, Revonsuo counters that these animals are 
bizarre and humanlike, and thus an unlikely source of images. He insists animal 
characters reflect ancestral scripts. 
In response to Germain et al. 's comments, Revonsuo argues that evidence from typical 
dreams is not relevant. Prevalence is not the same as frequency his research indicates 
that many memorable and prevalent themes do not occur frequently, for example sex and 
flying (Revonsuo & Valli, 2000). In contrast, his research indicates threat themes are 
both prevalent and frequent. He claims that sexual dreams are often negative or 
threatening. His only comment on the low prevalence of ancestral themes is that natural 
disasters are rare in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. the ancestral environment). He also queries 
what response could be adaptive in the face of an uncontrollable event of this kind. 
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Revonsuo insists that dreams show a unique preference for threatening events. Only 
threats impact markedly on dream content - he claims that there are no 'post-triumphant' 
dreams. He argues that the critics "cannot account for these systematic biases and causal 
relationships between real threats and dreaming" (Revonsuo, 2000b, p.l 065) 
Criticisms based on flaws in Revonsuo's reasoning 
Bizarreness and reduced volitional control: 
Many researchers consider bizarreness and reduced volitional control to be core features 
of dreaming (Hobson et al., 2000a; Mancia, 2000; Nielsen, 2000a; Solms, 2000). There 
is some evidence that dreaming brain processes contribute to these features. The 
deactivation of the prefrontal cortex means that executive monitoring is absent (Clancey, 
2000; Hobson et al., 2000a; Solms, 2000). It is also possible that changes in 
neuromodulation are involved: Hobson et al. (2000a) suggest that neuromodulation helps 
regulate "directed attention, deliberate thought, self-reflective awareness, orientation, 
emotion, memory and insight" (p.S33). Increased cholinergic activity in REM may 
reduce the reliability of cortical circuits, increasing the possibility of bizarre temporal 
sequences and associations, which are accepted uncritically because of reduced insight. 
They comment: 
"While it may well be true that many dreams are concerned with mundane, everyday themes, they 
are interconnected in an incongruous and discontinuous manner" (Hobson, Pace-Shott & 
Stickgold, 2000b, p.1020). 
Given the bizarre nature of dreams, the commentators find them unlikely sites for 
realistic rehearsals of survival skills (Flanagan, 2000). Zadra and Donderi (2000a) see 
this as particularly relevant to nightmares, one of Revonsuo's paradigm dream types. 
Contrary to Revonsuo's assertion that dream simulations are highly realistic, Bednar 
(2000) cites Dennett's (1991) contention that brain activity need not be realistic at all, 
provided the processing machinery treats it as such. This is perhaps precisely what 
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occurs in dreams, and thus unrealistic, bizarre features are only recognized in retrospect 
(Bednar, 2000). While instinctual programs, especially fight-flight responses, are often 
incorporated in dreams, reduced volitional control leads to dreamers seldom considering 
the possibility of controlling the sequence of events (Hobson et aI., 2000a). This argues 
against dreams being adaptive rehearsals of responses to threat. 
Revonsuo 's response (2000b): 
Revonsuo maintains that dreams are more organized than bizarre, claiming the degree of 
bizarreness is assumed rather than demonstrated. His research indicates only 15 20% 
of descriptions of objects, actions, persons or places were rated bizarre (Revonsuo & 
Salmivalli, 1995), while 50% of human characters were rated as identical to waking 
(Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2000). These codings, however, ignore the incongruous and 
discontinuous combinations that often constitute bizarreness. Revonsuo concludes 
"dreams are remarkably organized. No random process could ever create such a complex 
simulation of the waking perceptual world" (2000b, p.1066). It should be noted that 
Revonsuo assumes critics must subscribe to the idea of random activation in order to 
characterize dreams as bizarre. This is not the case (e.g. Solms). 
Not content to rely on one line of reasoning, Revonsuo then asserts that if bizarre 
elements occur, it is because the system is not functioning properly in the modem 
context. He claims recurrent dreams of ancestral threats and PTSD dreams prove that 
dreams are more realistic and less bizarre when activated by valid cues. His third and 
final argument, again admitting that bizarreness occurs, refers to a suggestion put forward 
by Cheyne (2000): some bizarre elements may be "functional exaggerations that test the 
limits of the system" (Revonsuo, 2000b, p.1067). Terrified slow motion running, for 
instance, may thus be the dreaming equivalent of training with a heavy pack. Revonsuo's 
argument seems inconsistent to say the least: his research indicates dreams are not 
bi7..arre~ if they are bizarre, it is because the threat simulation mechanism is not working 
correctIy~ or perhaps it is working, and bizarreness exists specifically to enhance threat 
simulation training. 
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Revonsuo pays little attention to the contention that executive functions are absent in 
dreams, and that volitional control and insight are consequently reduced. Referring 
specifically to Clancey's (2000) argument that dreams lack goal directed sustained 
attention, he argues this is an unfounded assumption rather than an empirical observation. 
Nightmares/PTSD dreams: 
Revonsuo's use of these dreams as exemplars of the threat simulation mechanism drew a 
great deal of criticism. Firstly, it was argued that problems are seldom solved in threat 
dreams: 
"it is difficult to see how our widely described paralyzed fears, slow motion running and escape 
tactics based on absurd reasoning could be a rehearsal or simulation of anything adaptive" (Hunt, 
2000, p.955). 
Zadra and Donderi (2000a) concur. In their analysis of nightmares from non-traumatized 
adults, they found threats but not adaptive responses, with many reports containing only a 
fear reaction. 
Schredl (2000) points to the marked relationship between psychopathology and negative 
dream emotions (e.g. Schredl & Englehardt, 2001; Hartmann, 1991), and many authors 
point to the negative impact recurrent nightmares have on waking life. Kramer (2000) 
and Levin (2000) agree: Revonsuo presents the nightmare as the prototype dream fully 
realizing its biological function and completely ignores its non·adaptive consequences. 
Levin (2000) points out that both PTSD and lifelong nightmare sufferers show 'impaired 
psychological functioning and attenuated information processing' (p.965), and that 
lifelong nightmare sufferers are at increased risk for developing schizophrenic-type 
disorders. He questions Revonsuo's analogy with the human immune system, which 
suggests that early exposure to threats would result in a better response in later life. "In 
fact, research has repeatedly demonstrated that exposure to early averse environmental 
events is a primary pathogenic pathway to later psychopathology" (Levin, 2000, p.965). 
Nielsen and Germain (2000) point out the obvious - Nightmare Disorder and PTSD are 
classified as dysfunctional, and are included in the DSM-IV. 
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Particular points were made regarding PTSD dreams. Levin (2000) queries why, if TST 
is valid, PTSD sufferers are overwhelmed by the very symptoms that should be adaptive. 
He points out that repetitive nightmares can last for fifty years post trauma without any 
reduction in psychological distress. Kramer (2000) and Schredl (2000) counter 
Revonsuo's contention that modem PTSD (referring to that engendered by war and 
concentration camps) is an aberrant response to threats not present in the ancestral 
environment. They point out that many other traumas resulting in PTSD (e.g. rape, 
incest, natural disasters and physical beatings) approximate traumas experienced in that 
period. Nielsen and Germain (2000) find it hard to reconcile PTSD sufferers' disturbed 
and debilitating waking and sleep function with TST, especially since PTSD dreams are 
triggered by ecologically valid cues, and are paradigm dreams in terms of Revonsuo's 
arguments. Yet PTSD sufferers show waking disturbances of key cognitive and 
physiological systems that would decrease chances of survival. 
Hunt concludes: "The view that nightmares and stress dreams show the essence of all dreaming is 
like saying the underlying purpose of the vestibular system ... is nausea and vomiting, because that 
is what happens when the system is overloaded in extreme dizziness" (2000, p.955). 
Revonsuo's Response (2000b): 
To the argument that threat dreams seldom contain meaningful responses, Revonsuo 
counters that his research (Revonsuo & Valli, 2000) indicates that if the dream self reacts 
to the threat, 94% of these reactions are appropriate. Irrelevant and impossible reactions 
are rare (6%). Note this does not tell us how often the dream self does react. Revonsuo 
acknowledges we need more investigation of both threat and response in dreams. With 
regard to Hunt's comment about paralyzed fears not being adaptive, Revonsuo asserts an 
initial freeze response is adaptive when a predator is noted in the distance. 
Revonsuo also questions the idea that threat simulation necessarily causes disturbing 
nightmares, stating his belief that the vast majority of threat simulations do not disturb 
sleep. Regarding the correlation between nightmares and psychological problems, 
Revonsuo points out that TST does not predict that the mechanism is adaptive in the 
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current context. He also points out that correlational data does not allow the assumption 
that dreams are causing psychopathology. He suggests these people tend to suffer from 
nightmares as a result of feeling more chronically threatened than the rest of the 
population. However, regardless of the direction of the relationship, disturbing dreams 
do not seem to improve waking functioning. 
Revonsuo acknowledges that the criticism around PTSD is an important issue to be 
addressed. He claims we need to establish whether threat simulation can be adaptive 
even if it leads to insomnia, fatigue and impaired performance. This question seems to 
answer itself. He further contends that ancestral humans did not suffer from PTSD 
because they were adapted to higher levels of stress, and the threats in their environment 
were "mostly familiar and predictable" (Revonsuo, 2000b, p. 1072). This argument begs 
the question of why familiar and predictable threats would require constant simulation in 
dreams. 
Revonsuo again contends that 'real' recurring PTSD dreams occur in war veterans, and 
victims of concentration camps - i.e. those who have been exposed to severe and 
prolonged threat that does not resemble ancestral conditions. On the other hand, he 
speculates, if ancestral humans did have PTSD, some features of the disorder, such as an 
increased startle response and hypervigilance, would be adaptive in a dangerous 
environment. 
It is difficult to regard speculation about PTSD in the Pleistocene as a serious attempt to 
address criticisms aimed at the logic of using these dreams as evidence for his 
hypothesized mechanism. Revonsuo's argument has become totally circular - PTSD 
dreams are used to support the hypothesis, and then the hypothesis is used to rationalize 
away contradictory aspects of PTSD. 
Direction of the relationship between emotion and dream content: 
Revonsuo assumes dream plots cause the preponderance of negative dream emotion. 
Bednar (2000) challenges this assumption regarding the direction of the relationship 
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between emotion and plot. The established dream feature of emotional continuity despite 
narrative discontinuity suggests the opposite relationship: an emotion is activated, and 
this prompts recall of events associated with that emotion. Whether the activation of 
emotion is due to brainstem processes (Hobson et aI., 2000a); to the engagement of the 
basic emotion SEEKING system (Solms, 2000); or to the brain's current emotional state 
(Hartmann, 1998); the direction remains the same: emotion -7 narrative. 
Some researchers claim REM brainstem processes activate the adjacent emotional centers 
in the limbic and paralimbic regions (Hobson et aI., 2000a; Kramer, 2000). This bottom-
up model sees emotion as the primary shaper of dream plots. "Since most of the basic 
emotions are negative, the associated dreams are also likely to be negative" (Flanagan, 
2000, p.938). They argue this explanation is more parsimonious because it explains 
dream content without needing to refer to specific selection pressures. Panksepp (2000) 
subscribes to a similar view, stating that in REM basomedial appetitive-emotional 
systems and other limbic areas become highly aroused. This argument, however, does 
not imply an acceptance of random brainstem processes being responsible for dream 
content. As Panksepp points out 
"Solms' point would still hold - the cognitive contents of dreams are not choreographed in any 
detail by REM processes; rather, REM is simply the most emotionally minded conductor of one 
dream symphony" (p.988). 
Hartmann's (1998) clinical analysis of dreams also suggests emotion shapes dream plots. 
He concludes that dreams serve to contextualize emotion: 
"in a classic anxiety dream, the plot may shift from feeling lost, to not having proper credentials, 
adequate equipment or suitable clothing, to missing a train. These plots all satisfY the driving 
emotion - anxiety - while being only very loosely associated with one another ... " (in Hobson et 
aI., 2000, p.825). 
In contrast, Revonsuo' s current model has an unspecified mechanism for selecting 
memories by their emotional salience (Bednar, 2000). 
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"Such a mechanism is difficult to imagine because it would supposedly operate independently of 
the current emotional state of the brain, since limbic areas like the amygdala are activated only 
later in his process" (Bednar, 2000, p.909). 
He argues that reversing the sequence results in the simpler, more concrete model 
presented above. 
Revonsuo's response (2000b): 
In his response to these criticisms, Revonsuo again assumes that all critics raising this 
point subscribe to what he calls Random Activation Theory, which sees dreams as 
epiphenomena of REM activation. It must be stressed that this is not the case. Even 
Hobson now acknowledges that REM forebrain activation is not random - imaging 
studies have clearly indicated consistent activation of specific areas. Stickgold (2000) 
claims that brainstem processes are not random, but are aimed at generating specific 
sequences of activity. Neither Panksepp nor Solms, who invoke basic emotion systems 
in explaining dreams, endorse RAT. 
Instead of addressing the question of the direction of the relationship between emotion 
and narrative, Revonsuo focuses on discrediting RAT ideas. His rebuttal is thus largely 
off topic. His chief argument is once again the contention that dreams are organized 
simulations, not random activation patterns. "Dreams are not noisy patterns of activation, 
but organized as simulations of 'self~in-world': when we dream, we find ourselves as an 
experientially embodied self in the center of a vi suo-spatial world of objects, persons and 
events" (p.l 064) this requires "highly coordinated interaction between several cognitive 
modules in the brain" (p.l 064), and shows that "dreaming is designed to be a 
sophisticated simulation of waking experience" (p.l 064). If Revonsuo took any note of 
Damasio's (1999) theory of consciousness, he would perhaps not find this so startling, 
and would notice that the experience of 'self-in-world' begins from the level of core 
consciousness. The first '1', or basic conscious experience of self, is located in the 
brainstem, surrounded both by maps of the self and the basic emotions. Providing 
consciousness of 'self-in-world' is precisely what the brain is designed to do, from this 
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level up. From this perspective noting that dreaming consciousness reflects this 'self-in-
world' is not remarkable, but is rather to be expected. 
Problems with memory consolidation restricted to SR responses: 
Clancey (2000) views Revonsuo's proposal that procedural memory can be consolidated 
in dreaming as problematic. Clancey argues that without aminergic sequencing (which is 
absent in cholinergic REM), procedural relations cannot be coordinated. "Dream 
experiences are indeed multi-modal, but they are not sequentially coordinated and 
therefore cannot be simulations of real experience" (Clancey, 2000, p.921). He continues 
that dream experience lacks insight into our true condition, which is what we depend on 
for flexible and appropriate responses in waking life. Clancey (2000) also points out that 
Revonsuo does not distinguish between stimulus-response association and human 
inference. Given that dreams lack goal-directed attention, logic, and analogical 
reasoning, it is hard to accept that they could constitute training episodes for highly 
skilled, complex responses in threat situations. They seem to be restricted to primitive 
SRifight-flight responses. 
Montangero (2000) concurs, and questions the need for rehearsal: 'threat avoidance 
'skills' represented in dreams, such as fleeing or hiding, are so elementary and instinctual 
that it is difficult to imagine how their representation could help to improve them 
(Montangero, 2000, p.973). Schredl (2000) makes a similar point: classical conditioning 
of avoidance responses happens very quickly; thus repetition is unnecessary. Domhoff 
(2000) agrees, stating he cannot see how 
"chase and attack dreams, which rarely contain successful defensive actions in any event, could 
make human beings any more primed for reacting to threat than they are due to the one-trial fear-
conditioning system that is already found in reptiles" (p.930). 
Clancey concludes: 
"One implication of Revonsuo's theory is that dreaming reinforces an unthinking way of 
responding to threat situations, merely based on reactive, perceptually and emotionally driven 
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behavior. If this was indeed an evolutionary advantage, it was originally conferred on other 
mammals, not Pleistocene man. Such learned associations, if any, are not like skilled human 
knowledge, because they are not procedurally integrated and flexibly controlled" (Clancey, 2000, 
p.921). 
Revonsuo's response (2000b): 
In response to the above critiques, Revonsuo again asserts that the claimed lack of goal-
directed attention, logic, analogical reasoning in dreams is an assumption, He ignores the 
established fact of prefrontal deactivation entirely. He insists that threat simulations were 
necessary, as threat perception and avoidance are complex skills, not compatible with SR 
conditioning. This is precisely the point critics are making, while questioning a) whether 
what we know of dreaming brain activity supports the possibility of high level problem 
solving occurring within this context; and b) whether dream threats and responses are not 
usually more primitive. These concerns are not addressed. 
A product of human evolution? 
Revonsuo's proposition that the threat simulation mechanism of dreaming was selected 
specifically during human evolution does not seem to hold water. Kriekhaus (2000) 
disputes that this mechanism was selected in hunter-gatherer period - "both the 
phenomenon of dreaming and its neural substrates are present throughout mammalia" 
(p.962). Clancey (2000) points out that primitive emotion response patterns evolved 
before Revonsuo's proposed timeframe in the Pleistocene era. Bednar (2000) finds the 
idea that dreams may rehearse species-specific skills for all animals more credible than 
the limited application to humans. This theory, however, has already been put forward 
by both louvet (1975) and Winson (1993). Bednar also points out that threat simulation 
would surely be more useful for prey species than predators. Panksepp (2000) calls this 
an empirical difficulty for Revonsuo: research indicates predators tend to have more 
REM than prey. 
Revonsuo 's response (2000b): 
Regarding the query as to why predators exhibit more REM, Revonsuo responds that 
predators lacking hiding places have to be eternally vigilant. He does not address the 
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issue of the timing of the selection of dreaming mechanisms - he has claimed that this 
occurred specifically during human evolution. Once again, his response does not 
satisfactorily address critical concerns. 
Formally evaluating Threat Simulation Theory 
Clearly Revonsuo' s proposed theory has drawn a great deal of criticism. Despite this 
fact, it must be remembered that it passed a stringent peer review process and was 
published in a highly respected, high impact journal. Many approve of an evolutionary 
theoretical approach, and some welcome TST as a viable theory (Gottesmann, 2000; 
Humphrey, 2000; Kriekhaus, 2000; Shackelford & Weekes-Shackelford, 2000; 
Wichlinski,2000). It thus remains important to formally address the question of TST's 
scientific worth. 
Revonsuo appears to have arrived at TST through a process of induction. He has sifted 
through masses of empirical evidence about dreaming and dream content, and has used 
ampliative reasoning to arrive at a conclusion not inherent in the premises of the 
argument: namely, that dreaming is an adaptive mechanism selected during human 
evolution. Induction confirms theories as follows: a theory gives rise to predictions, and 
if many predictions turn out to be true, the theory is confirmed (putnam, 1981). Strength 
of confirmatory support, however, is a relative matter: many observations lend more 
support, but can never completely confirm the conclusion (Salmon, 1992). Revonsuo & 
Valli (2000) conducted a study in which they assert predictions derived from TST were 
supported, and that the theory is confirmed. This study will be discussed below, and the 
authors' confidence in the confirmation of the theory will be called into question. 
Induction has been severely criticized (Putnam, 1981). Because inductive reasoning is 
ampliative, its conclusions are not necessitated by its premises. Hence, an argument may 
contain true premises and yet have a false conclusion; for example: 'all observed ravens 
have been black' may be true, but the conclusion 'all ravens are black' may nonetheless 
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be false. Critically, the argument is prone to erosion - the addition of the single premise 
'one observed raven was white' erodes the argument entirely (Salmon, 1992). The 
Requirement of Maximal Specificity attempts to address this concern: when constructing 
an inductive argument, all available relevant knowledge must be included (Salmon, 
1992). Revonsuo has been accused of ignoring evidence that is inconsistent with his 
theorizing. 
Popper (1934, in Gillies, 1993) adopts Hume's critique of induction: it is logically 
unjustifiable, and should be excluded from science. If induction is rejected, where does 
that leave TST? In order to both maintain the rejection of induction, and yet allow 
knowledge to move beyond what is already known, Popper argues science should 
progress through a process of conjecture and refutation. Theory generation should be 
bold and creative, and not subject to any logical restrictions. Popper would thus have no 
problem with TST being speculative. 
The crux, however, lies in the justification of theories. Any scientific theory must be 
subjected to logical scrutiny. Knowledge may well advance through unjustifiable 
conjectures, but these must be constrained by the stringent critique of testing and 
refutation. According to Popper, the scientific method should aim to falsify conjectures 
by subjecting them to the most rigorous testing possible. The most important question to 
ask about a theory thus is: can it be tested? Untestable theories belong in the realm of 
metaphysics. 
'Theories are ... never empirically verifiable ... But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or 
scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience' (popper, 1934, in Gillies, 1993, 
p.180). 
'It is not so much the number of corroborating instances which detennines the degree of 
corroboration as the severity of the various tests to which the hypothesis in question can be, and 
has been, subjected' (Popper, 1934, in Gillies, 1993, p.21S). 
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Although Popper's demarcation criterion (falsifiability) has been rejected, the common 
assumption that the method of falsification is also suspect is unfounded (Gillies, 1993). 
Donald Gillies, a student of both Sir Karl Popper and of Imre Lakatos, has strongly 
argued for the acceptance of a demarcation criterion based on confirmability, and for 
retaining falsification for the purposes of testing theories. In the case of theories that, like 
TST, are perhaps confirmable, but are not falsifiable by anyone test, it remains essential 
to turn parts of them into hypotheses to be tested: 
, ... in order to get to theories which are well confirmed, it is necessary to submit any theory we 
propose to harsh criticism with severe experimental testing. Only if a theory survives this ordeal 
can it become welJ confirmed' (Gillies, 1993, p.223). 
The various predictions derived from each of TST' s propositions have been listed above. 
Revonsuo (2000a) claims these are all testable in principle, and that most tests could be 
actually be carried out. In concluding his target article, Revonsuo (2000a) attempts to 
preempt critiques of TST' s untestability: 
"As an evolutionary hypothesis, the threat simulation theory of dreaming concerns historical 
events, and the historical events themselves of course cannot be subjected to observation or 
experimental manipulation. But it would not be correct to say for example, that theories on what 
caused the mass extinction of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago, or why Asia has got the 
Himalayas, are not empirically testable because the original events cannot be observed or 
experimented on. Therefore, the threat simulation hypothesis is open to empirical testing, 
confirmation and disconfirmation to the same extent as any other hypotheses regarding the causal 
mechanisms at work in the past, leading the natural world to be as it is in the present" (2000a, p. 
894). 
Some commentators, however, remam doubtful about TST's testability. Hunt (2000) 
claims TST is as untestable as Freud's primal horde theory. Mealey (2000) points out 
that we cannot separate waking cognitive biases relating to threats from possible biases in 
dream events and dream recall. Thus we cannot test whether dreams are biased towards 
producing threat scenarios - we cannot set up a null model. Revonsuo' s (2000b) claim 
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that modem dreams are not representative of the function for which the mechanism was 
selected also seems to put TST dangerously close to the realm of the untestable. 
A section on 'how to test TST properly' (2000b, p. 1063) is included in Revonsuo's 
response to the commentaries. He asserts that the following facts do not disconfirm TST: 
that many dreams do not simulate threats; that some threat simulations disrupt sleep and 
have negative effects; that dreams contain bizarre features; and that nightmares and 
recurrent dreams correlate with psychological dysfunction. He clearly believes he has 
satisfactorily countered these challenges to the logic of TST. 
He argues that only the following facts would be problematic for TST: (2000b, p. 1081) 
1. All highly emotionally charged events result in recurrent dream simulations; i.e. there is 
no specific threat response. 
2. Ancestral threats existed which we never dream about. 
3. Children and adolescents exposed to ancestral type threats since childhood have dreams 
which do not simulate these threats or efficient responses to them. 
4. Current hunter-gatherer dreams only infrequently simulate threats. 
5. A culture exists where threat simulation dreams or nightmares do not occur. 
6. Threat simulations do not improve perceptual and motor skills, and do not improve 
subsequent performance in threatening situations. 
We are not bound to agree with Revonsuo about what does and does not tend to refute 
TST. The critical point is that the theory needs to be tested. 
Subsequent research on TST 
Very few studies have set out directly to examine aspects of the theory, but there are 
relevant results from several independent projects. In his introduction to the book edition 
of the BBS articles, Blagrove (2003) refers to a number of pertinent findings. For 
instance, he states that Revonsuo's idea of skill rehearsal in dreams leading to improved 
performance even without explicit memory for the dream, is in line with research 
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conducted and discussed by Bargh and Ferguson (2000). They show that complex higher 
mental processes can occur without conscious choice or guidance. 
With specific reference to TST, Petersen, Henke and Hayes (2002) argue that as the 
limbic system is very active both in dreams and during waking threat, individuals with 
relative limbic hyperfunction should report more threatening dreams. Limbic function 
was measured using a checklist, and the hypothesis was confirmed, lending support to 
TST. The limbic region, however, is involved in all emotion, not just fear, so it is 
possible that this group would report more intense emotional dreams overall, not simply 
more threat dreams. 
Picchione, Goeltzenleucher, Green et at. (2002) examined the possibility that nightmares 
are adaptive, aiding coping with stress. 412 students completed retrospective self-report 
questionnaires for course credit. The authors examined relations between stress, coping 
mechanisms, and nightmares. They found a relationship between nightmares and 
intensity of waking coping: participants who reported using active coping strategies in 
waking life also tended to report more nightmares. This appears to be supportive 
evidence for TST, assuming the direction of the relationship to be nightmare simulations 
leading to better coping. Picchi one and Hicks (2002), commenting on the same study, 
characterize dreams as problem solvers which may operate in various ways: 1) through 
systematic desensitization~ 2) assisting with emotional problem solving and insight; and 
3) as threat simulations which improve performance. As an example ofTST functioning 
adaptively, they suggest a person worried about giving a presentation may dream about it 
and thus do better in the actual event. It should be noted that this is not precisely what 
TST proposes. Revonsuo has explicitly stated that the mechanism is not likely to be 
adaptive in our current context, and would only be efficient at handling ancestral threats. 
Additionally, the mechanism only activates in response to actual threat events - benefits 
accrue to future occasions of the same threat. The function these authors seem to 
envisage for nightmares seems to cohere more with Cartwright (1996) and Hartmann's 
(1998) concepts of dreams being processorslintegrators of emotional material, rather than 
as contexts in which new learning (i.e. better threat perception and enhanced threat 
avoidance) occurs. 
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Another study reports very different results regarding dream content and stress. Delorme, 
Lortie-Lussier and Koninck (2002) had students keep dream diaries for two ten-day 
periods, one during examinations and one during an examination free period. The 
students also recorded their moods and their coping strategies. Stress level and waking 
negative emotions were found to be equivalent across all students. The authors found a 
significant negative correlation between harm/threat waking emotions and negative 
dream emotions - namely, the more apprehensive/fearful the students were feeling, the 
more likely they were to have positive dreams that night. This is not what TST predicts. 
Additionally, in apparent contradiction of Picchione et al.'s (2002) results, they found 
that students who did incorporate examination themes in their dreams had less active 
waking coping strategies, while those who did not incorporate stress themes used active 
problem solving strategies more frequently in waking life. Given the relative 
unreliability of retrospective self-report data (used by Picchione et al.), more weight 
should perhaps be given to Delorme et al.' s findings, which are based on a prospective 
study. These contradict TST's claims that exposure to threat leads to threat simulations, 
and that threat simulations lead to improved performance in waking life. Of course, 
Revonsuo could dismiss both studies as irrelevant, because they do not specifically refer 
to ancestral threat cues - the mechanism may not be functional in this modem context. 
In another study mentioned by Blagrove (2003), Roussy et al. (2000) had participants 
record daily events and dreams for six days. Independent judges were unable to detect 
any correspondence between daily events and dream content. Once again, as Blagrove 
also notes, these results may be of questionable relevance if we accept that the threat 
simulation mechanism is not currently activated. TST only predicts that severe threat 
experiences will impact on dream content in any consistent fashion. 
Blagrove (2003) then points to a study by Hartmann, Zborowski, Rosen, & Grace (2001), 
which he suggests may give some support to Revonsuo's argument that exposure to 
threats activates the threat simulation mechanism. These authors found that 
Contextualizing Images are more intense in those who have been traumatized (a CI is a 
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powerful image that provides a context for the dominant emotion of the dream). Note, 
however, that having more intense CI's does not mean the participants are experiencing 
simulations of the threat event - as stated previously, a dominant dream emotion can be 
contextualized in several unrelated plots. 
In a later study, Hartmann and Basile (2003) examined dream content in individuals who 
regularly record their dreams, from records prior to and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the USA. They found that after the trauma, dreams became significantly more 
emotionally intense, but did not contain material directly related to the attacks. 
Interestingly, in terms of dream emotion, the trend was towards an increase in fear, but 
this did not reach significance - other emotions were also highly represented. The 
authors conclude that intensity rather than specific emotion differentiates between pre 
and post 9/11 dreams. Contrary to TST, these individuals did not report threat simulation 
dreams, and it appears that all dream emotions became intensified in response to the 
trauma. However, although many Americans felt traumatized after the event, it could be 
argued that only actual, personal exposure to a life-threatening event can be expected to 
activate the threat simulation mechanism. 
In the following study, actual personal exposure did occur. In a prospective study, 
Mellman, David, Bustamante and Torres (2001) examined dreams in the aftermath of 
life-threatening injuries. They found that subjects who reported dream simulations of the 
trauma had more severe PTSD symptoms at both initial and follow-up assessments (6 
months later), than those reporting dreams with other content, or no dreams. This clearly 
argues against an adaptive function for threat simulation dreams. 
Another Finnish researcher, Raija-Leena Punamaki, works in the area of trauma and 
dreams. Interestingly, Revonsuo makes no reference to her work, although given that 
Punamaki is working with children growing up in life-threatening conditions, her 
findings are highly pertinent to his assertions. Her sample consists of two groups of 
Palestinian children, one living in a peaceful area in Galilee, and the other in the chaotic 
conditions of the Gaza strip, consistently exposed to life-threats. In her 1993 project, 
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households were randomly selected within the two areas, and families and children 
agreed to participate in the study, keeping a dream and mood diary for seven days. 
The traumatized group was found to have more frequent dream recall; and the hypothesis 
that frequent dream recall would be associated with poor psychological adjustment was 
confirmed. More frequent recallers had more depressive, somatic and anxiety symptoms 
(Punamaki,1997). There was an association between pre-sleep mood and dream content 
in the trauma group, but this relationship was in the opposite direction to that expected. 
The more negative the evening mood, the more the children reported positive dreams, 
and vice versa (Punamaki, 1999). This corresponds with Delorme et al. 's (2002) finding, 
and contradicts the idea that trauma impacts directly and immediately on dream content. 
Factor analysis of all the dream data yielded a five-factor model which explained 46.2% 
of the variance in the dreams (Punamaki, 1999). Children in the trauma group had both 
more Threatening Stranger dreams and more Family dreams (which are positive). TST 
would predict more Threatening Stranger dreams, but would not expect an increase in 
positive affiliation dreams. Moreover, Threatening Stranger Dreams (the 2nd factor) had 
the following aspects: strangers involved as actors; unpleasant atmosphere; dreamer as 
observer; low vividness; attacking human relationships; unfavorable outcomes; anxiety, 
persecution; hostile and aggressive themes. Thus although threatening stranger dreams 
were more common in the children exposed to life threats, contrary to TST's predictions 
these dreams tended not to feature the dreamer actively responding to the threat, and did 
not tend to end in escapes from the threat. This is critical, given that Revonsuo has 
repeatedly hypothesized that the mechanism should be most active in children, 
particularly those exposed to severe threatening events. 
Revonsuo himself appears to have conducted only one project related to TST: a study by 
Revonsuo and Valli (2000) set out specifically to test TST, and the authors concluded 
that the theory was empirically confirmed. The only other work by Revonsuo relating to 
TST, an article published in the Finnish journal Psykologia (Valli & Revonsuo, 2000), 
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reports the same study. The remainder of Revonsuo's recent work seems to be focused 
on other aspects of consciousness and cognition. 
In the 2000 study, fifty-two Finnish university students kept dream diaries for four 
weeks, resulting in a sample of 592 dreams. These were analyzed using a rating scale 
specifically designed by the authors to quantifY threatening events in dreams. Two threat 
categories were defined: 
1) Objective threat: any situation where the dreamer's physical or mental well-
being, physical resources or territory is threatened. The threat could either occur 
directly in the dream, or the dreamer could hear about it. (Note how broad this 
category is: including psychological/emotional threats as well as actual physical 
threats~ and situations where the dream threat is hearsay rather than a simulation 
per se). 
2) Subjective threat: any event interpreted or emotionally experienced as somehow 
dangerous. 
Threats were then analyzed on 8 dimensions: 1) the nature of the threat~ 2) its target~ 3) 
its severity; 4) the dreamer' s participation~ 5) the dreamer's reaction; 6) consequences of 
the threat~ 7) its resolution~ and 8) its source. 
The nature of the threat comprised six categories: pursuits; accidents and misfortunes; 
catastrophes; disease; failures; and aggression. It should be noted that 'pursuits' included 
instances of pursuit by monsters, 'animals or comparable living beings' or where the 
source of pursuit was unclear. There was thus no constraint on the threat being realistic. 
'Aggression' included indirect aggression; i.e. verbal aggression, teasing and trespassing. 
There was no constraint on the aggression being physicaL Threat severity was rated as 
follows: 1) life-threat or physically dangerous~ 2) socially, psychologically or financially 
severe; 3) trivial. 
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Three judges - all aware of the hypotheses under investigation - coded the dream reports. 
All content scores were based on agreement between two of the three judges - only if all 
three disagreed was an item discarded. The authors claim inter-rater reliability was 
acceptable (simple percentage agreement was accepted at > 65%; Kappa values were 
accepted at > 0.4; and ranged from 0.43-0.79). 
The results indicated that 66.4% of all dreams contained at least one threat. The authors 
report that 79% of subjects reported at least one life-threatening dream event. It is not 
clear how they determined this - in the listed content categories and in the attached 
examples, life-threats and physically dangerous threats comprised a single category. In 
terms of severity, only 22% of all threats were rated as life threatening or physically 
dangerous. 78% of threats were thus not physical: 17% were social, psychological or 
financial threats; and most threats (61 %) were rated as trivial. Revonsuo & Valli, 
however, concluded: "Thus in dreams, about 40% of the threatening events reported by 
our normal subjects were either life threatening or otherwise more severe than they would 
be expected to encounter during waking". This seems to be overstating the case 
somewhat - we do not know how severe the physically dangerous threats were; and 
social, psychological, and financial threats are hardly rare in waking life. 
The results indicated no response to 46% of dream threats. Astonishingly, Revonsuo & 
Valli conclude: " If you leave out events where participation of self could not or did not 
occur, in 94% of the remaining cases, the action was appropriate and relevant". 
Furthermore, only 32% of threats had a 'happy ending'; while 37% ended badly, and 
31 % were discontinuous/disrupted. Clearly, only a small proportion of threats were 
resolved, and the information given by the authors does not clarifY whether the 'happy 
ending' was due to the dreamer's actions, and whether these were realistic or not. 
Revonsuo claims to have found an association between severity of threat and appropriate 
response to the threat: the more severe the threat, the more likely the dreamer is to 
respond appropriately (X2[l,N=?] 18.58, P < 0.001). However, Chi-square is perhaps not 
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the appropriate analysis, as the data are not independent. The sample of 592 dreams 
comes from only 52 subjects. 
In the discussion, Revonsuo and Valli (2000) state that TST is clearly confirmed by this 
data. Another interpretation is possible. The coding categories are so inclusive that 
important distinctions are obscured (e.g. physical vs. life-threat; physical vs. indirect 
aggression; realistic pursuit vs. bizarre/impossible). Despite this; despite coding not 
being done by blind raters; and despite low inter-rater reliability being accepted; only 
22% of dream threats were coded as physically dangerous or life-threatening. In 
addition, half of the time the dreamer did not respond to the threat; and only 1I3rd of 
threats had a happy ending. Thus it could be concluded that relevant threats were few, 
and that the critical successful avoidance response was even less evident. Ultimately, 
regardless of the interpretation of the results, because of the lenient criteria used 
throughout this study, it can hardly be regarded as a severe test ofTST. 
Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004) attempted a more stringent test. A large sample 
(N=40 1) of Most Recent Dream reports was collected and analyzed for threat content. 
The definition of threat was limited to those that are realistic and physical. The aim was 
to establish the proportion of dreams containing realistic physical threats to the dreamer; 
how many of these represent life-threatening events; and whether the dreamer 
successfully and realistically escapes. Reports were coded by six blind raters, and 
percentage of perfect agreement between raters was 86%. 
The results of this study contradicted aspects of TST' s Proposition 2, which predicts that 
threats should be over-represented in dreams. Only 21.19% of reports contained physical 
threats, meaning that almost 80% of dream content was not physically threatening in any 
way. Less than 10% contained realistic life-threats. Relevant threatening content thus 
does not seem to be over-represented in dreams. Moreover, escapes were even more rare 
- only 2.74% of dreams contained realistic escapes from realistic, life-threatening events. 
The proposed threat simulation mechanism can only bestow adaptive advantage if dreams 
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contribute to escaping threats - merely simulating unresolved threat experiences surely 
cannot suffice. 
The low proportion of dreams containing threats also needs to be considered in context: 
62% of our participants reported having experienced a real life-threatening event. Hence 
our results also run counter to Proposition 3, which asserts that exposure to real threats 
activates the mechanism. Our sample was drawn from an area where ecologically valid 
cues are present: the mechanism should be operationaL 
Two noteworthy limitations of this study were pointed out by reviewers. Firstly, we did 
not obtain a date for the actual life-threatening event experienced by our participants, so 
it was argued that assuming the threat mechanism remained activated by this one event 
was problematic. Our intention was to demonstrate that the participants live in an 
environment where ecologically valid cues are operational, and where people feel 
threatened, not that one experience should have resulted in the mechanism operating 
indefinitely. We were attempting to establish the presence of ancestral type threats in 
participants' lives contrary to Revonsuo's assertion that modem life lacks selection 
pressures. This aspect of the study clearly needs to be addressed more carefully. 
The second criticism was that even the low proportion of life-threats in dreams indicated 
by this study must be more than would be encountered in real life. If we regard the 
percentages obtained as a proportion of the total night's dream events, we would have to 
multiply them by four (the average number of dreams per night). 21% physical threats 
and 8.5% life-threatening events would multiply out to 306 physical dream threats and 
123 life-threatening dream events per year much higher figures than could be expected 
for actual life experiences. Note, however, that this argument still does not address the 
issue of successful escape being rare. It also assumes that there are no dream recall 
biases favouring salient or threatening dreams. Moreover, it is possible that the incidence 
of many classes of dream event would be greater than that encountered in real life _. 
losing one's teeth for instance, or appearing naked, or flying, certainly happen more 
frequently in dreams than in any comparable year. Another paper (in preparation) will 
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examine all dream events in terms of basic emotions to ascertain whether all biologically 
significant events are over-represented in dreams, not just threat/fear as proposed by 
Revonsuo. 
Aims 
The aIm of this study was thus primarily to address the need for more careful 
measurement of actual and subjective sense of threat. It was also decided that a 
comparative study, looking at different groups would greatly strengthen the design. As 
previously mentioned, the argument that TST is not functional in the modem 
environment, because of the absence of ecologically valid threat stimuli, very nearly 
renders the theory unfalsifiable. However, Revonsuo does postulate that if ecologically 
valid cues are present, the mechanism should activate. He also explicitly states that: 
"The threat simulation system can be activated in different degrees. The lowest level of activation 
should occur in an environment that is completely safe and where the individual is free from stress 
and fear. The highest level of activation (a strong threat simulation response) should occur in an 
environment where the individual's life and physical well-being is seriously threatened" (2000b, 
p. 1080). 
Thus, if two very different contexts could be established, one in which ecologically valid 
threat cues are present and one in which they are largely absent, TST would predict more 
threat simulations in the dreams of people living in the high threat context. One way in 
which this comparison could be accomplished would be to contrast dream content from a 
region where violent crime is prevalent with that from an area where it occurs very rarely. 
Violent crime comprising murder; rape; assault; and armed robbery - is both an 
ecologically valid threat in terms of TST, and one whose levels are objectively recorded 
in national crime statistics databases. My main aim was thus to identifY two such regions 
and to compare the incidence of threat simulations in the dreams of individuals living in 
these two contexts. It was also considered advisable to identifY a third region, ranking 
between the two extremes of threat prevalence, to provide a calibration point. Given that 
some ecologically valid threat cues are operational in the middle context, TST would then 
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predict a gradient: most threat simulation dreams should occur in the context containing 
the highest prevalence of ecologically valid threat cues; fewer in the 'in between' 
context; and the lowest frequency of dream threat simulations should occur in the low 
ecologically valid threat context. The incidence of physical threats; life-threats; and 
realistic escapes in dreams will be compared across the groups. 
Another assertion that this study aims to investigate in a preliminary manner, is TST's 
contention that only the experience of threatening events impacts on dream content in a 
consistent fashion. 
"TST predicts that if an individual experiences real events, each one of which elicits different 
(positive and negative) strong emotions, the events that represent serious threats for the individual 
or significant others (e.g. physical assault, serious accident) will be incorporated into dreams as 
threat simulations significantly more often, and such dreams will persist significantly longer than 
any dreams incorporating the events involved in non-threatening emotional events" (Revonsuo, 
2000b, p. 1080) 
Revonsuo (2000b) explicitly states that proving otherwise would be the quickest way to 
falsity TST. I therefore intend to contrast reports of dreams following actual threatening 
and positive experiences in order to examine this prediction. If it can be shown that 
participants report dreams subsequent to positive events to a similar degree that they 
report dreams subsequent to threatening events, Revonsuo' s main line of argument would 
be undermined. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD 
Sample 
Non-random, purposive sampling was used to access groups that live in very different 
contexts, i.e. the Western Cape in South Africa; North Wales in the UK; and an 
historically black university in the US, located in Tuskegee, Alabama. Much of the 
credibility of this study rests on establishing that participants are exposed to very 
different levels of ecologically valid threats. The following crime statistics are intended 
to provide support for this contention, and hence the inclusion of these particular sample 
groups (See Appendix A for source statistics, calculations and definitions). 
The UK and South Africa are known to differ markedly in levels of violent crime; and 
within these contexts North Wales ranks significantly lower than the UK national average 
(Dodd, Nicholas, Povey & Walker, 2004); while the Western Cape ranks higher than the 
South African national average (Leggett, 2004). In many categories the Western Cape 
has the country's fastest growing crime problem (Leggett, 2004). It has South Africa's 
highest murder rate, and is the only province in which the murder rate has increased since 
1994 (Leggett, 2003). The South African national murder rate (see Table 1) is similar to 
that of Washington, DC, the most dangerous urban area in the US (Leggett, 2003), Since 
2002, Colombia has adopted South Africa's previous position as murder capital of the 
world, but the Western Cape 2003/04 rate of 62 murders per 100 000 is close to the 
Colombian figure of 66 per 100 000 (Leggett, 2003). In fact, in the 2002/03 period, the 
Western Cape figure was 85 murders per 100000 (Leggett, 2003), greatly exceeding the 
Colombian national average. 
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Table 1: Violent Crime Statistics for the Western Cape and South Africa, 2003/04 
WestemCape SA National 
Murder 62 43 
Attempted Murder 80 65 
Culpable Homicide 27 24 
Armed Robbery 303 287 
Rape 138 113 
Indecent Assault 62 20 
Assault/Grievous 
808 558 
Bodily Harm 
Figures per 100 000 
Based on Institute of Security Studies statistics 
In contrast to South Africa, violent crime in the UK appears to be relatively rare. 
According to the British Crime Survey (Dodd et aI., 2004), crime has decreased by 39% 
since 1995, and violent crime has decreased by over a third. The risk of becoming a 
victim of crime has dropped by half. Levels of worry about crime have dropped and 
confidence in the justice system has increased. Within this milieu, Wales has the lowest 
personal victimization rates in the country, combined with significantly lower levels of 
worry about crime (Dodd et al., 2004). 
Unfortunately, crime categorization in the UK is sufficiently idiosyncratic to make direct 
comparisons across countries difficult. In the UK, the category 'Violent Crime' includes 
three subsections: 'Violence against the person'; 'Sexual offences'~ and 'Robbery'. Both 
'Violence against the person' and 'Sexual offences' are extensive categories, containing 
non-violent crimes (e.g. concealment of birth; bigamy; soliciting; etc; see Appendix A for 
full list) as well as the more typical murder, rape, assaultlGBH and armed robbery As a 
result of this inclusiveness, 52% of reported violent crimes in the UK do not lead to 
injury of the victim; while 39% lead only to less serious woundings, such as grazes, 
bruises and black eyes (Dodd et aI., 2004). Crime figures for Wales were only reported 
as totals under these three broad categories, and therefore are not useful for the current 
purposes. The UK figures for relevant violent crimes are listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Violent Crime Statistics for the UK, 2003/04 
UK Totals for 2003/04 p/lOO 000 ----------------------- ~--~~~~. 
Homicide 
Attempted Murder 
More Serious wounding 
Rape 
853 1.43 
884 1.48 
19358 33 
12354 21 
Indecent assault 26709 45 
Based on statistics provided in Dodd et al (2004) 
The third context I attempted to sample was a black population in the US. The university 
which granted access to participants is a black university in Tuskegee, Alabama. In the 
US, the category Violent Crime includes homicide, rape, robbery and assault, all of 
which have a high risk of injury or death for the victim (Mitchell, Goggins & Cobert 
Roberts, 2003). Table 3 gives comparative figures for Tuskegee and US national rates: 
Tuskegee rates are clearly higher than the US national average. 
Table 3: Violent Crime Statistics for Tuskegee and US National Figures, 2002 
Tuskegee US National 
Murder 8.38 5.6 
Rape 75.31 33 
AssaultlGBH 359.8 310 
Robberies 251.03 145.9 
Figures ptl00 000 
Statistics for Tuskegee, Alabama; 2002 (most recent available); based on 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Reports 
Table 4 indicates a comparison between the Western Cape, Tuskegee and the UK. 
Specific violent crime figures for Wales are not available: we know that they would be 
lower than the UK average (Dodd et aI., 2004). There is a clear gradient across the three 
different contexts, with most violent crime occurring in the Western Cape, an 
intermediate level occurring in Tuskegee, and a very low level occurring in the 
UKJWales. Ecologically valid threats in the form of violent crime thus differ markedly in 
the three different contexts: hence the decision to sample specifically from these regions. 
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Table 4: Comparing Violent Crime Rates Across Contexts 
WestemCape Tuskegee UK 
Murder 62 8 
Attempted Murder 80 a 2 
Rape 138 75 21 
Assault/GBH 808 360 33b 
Armed robbery 303 251 c 
Figures p/lOO 000 
a) Listed as assault 
b) This is the 'More Serious Wounding' class, which is more inclusive than Assault/GBH 
c) No figure available 
Three universities agreed to provide access to participants: the University of Cape Town 
in the Western Cape; the University of North Wales in Bangor; and the University of 
Tuskegee in Alabama. Participants were undergraduate psychology and biology students. 
Revonsuo (2000b) states that because life expectancy in our ancestral past was perhaps 
25, the threat simulation mechanism should be optimally active in those under 20. Using 
samples of students is thus particularly apt in this case. The median ages were 20, 19, 
and 19 for the Western Cape, North Wales, and Tuskegee participants respectively. 
Participation was voluntary and informed consent was obtained. Participants were not 
informed of the exact aims of the study, but were told it entailed detailed analysis of 
dream content and its relationship to real life events. The number of participants 
accessed in the three universities varied widely, and the ratio of females to males was 
consistently higher in each sample (See Table 5). The possible impact this gender 
imbalance might have on results will be carefully examined. 
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Table 5: Sample composition - Gender 
Female Male Row Totals 
SA 172 36 208 
82.69% 17.31% 
Wales 87 29 116 
75% 25% 
USA 26 8 34 
76.47% 23.53% 
Domhoff (1996) established that a sample of 100 • 120 Most Recent Dream (MRD) 
reports successfully approximates the established Hall and Van de Castle dream content 
norms. The sample sizes for the two most divergent and hence important contexts (i.e. 
the Western Cape and North Wales) were sufficient to provide a representative sample of 
MRD reports. The US sample is unfortunately very small, hence both power and 
representativeness are likely to be problematic. 
It was anticipated that the Welsh sample would be mainly white: this would be in keeping 
with targeting a low threat exposure group. The US sample was specifically selected to 
be black, in order to access a higher level of threat exposure than that of typical white 
Americans. The South African group is mixed, with two thirds of the participants being 
white (See Table 6). It can be argued that in South Africa, whites are not exposed to 
crime to the same degree as blacks. It is thus possible that this sample may not reflect a 
group that is exposed to high levels of violence, as indicated by the crime statistics. The 
self-report data collected on experience of actual threats, and on perceived exposure to 
threats, will be used to examine this possibility. This data will enable verification of 
relative threat exposure for all groups. 
Table 6: Sample composition - Race 
White Black Row Totals 
SA 136 69 205 
% 66.34% 33.65% 
Wales 105 11 116 
% 90.52% 9.48% 
USA 0 34 34 
% 0 100% 
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Materials 
Participants were given a questionnaire that began with a Most Recent Dream (MRD) 
report. The MRD method was developed for efficient collection of large numbers of 
dream reports, and provides a representative sample if at least 100-125 reports are 
collected (Avila-White, Schneider & Domhoff, 1999). The method has been used 
worldwide, across all age groups, and has been found to provide reliable results 
(Domhoff, 1996). The method yields results that are not appreciably different from REM 
awakenings, and is thus valid (Domhoff & Schneider, 1999). The instructions used to 
obtain this report followed those recommended as standard by Domhoff(1996). 
Participants were then asked to report whether they had experienced a life-threatening 
event in real life; to describe it and to note when it happened. They were also asked if 
they later dreamed of this event; and if so, to record the dream and to indicate whether 
and how often it recurred. They were then asked to estimate how many physical threats 
they encounter per week, and to list the type of threats encountered. Finally, participants 
were asked if they had ever experienced an overwhelmingly positive event in real life; to 
describe it and to note when it happened. They were then asked if they had later dreamed 
of this event; to record the dream and to estimate how often it occurred. (See Appendix 
B for questionnaire). 
Procedure 
Questionnaires were distributed at the start of lectures. Participants were instructed to 
complete the questionnaire page by page and not to read ahead, as the focus on threats 
later in the questionnaire might have primed recall on the Most Recent Dream report. 
However, I cannot be certain that this instruction was followed in all cases. 
Six independent raters coded the responses. They were unaware both of Revonsuo's 
theory and the aims of the study, and were simply told it revolved around analysis of 
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dream content and real life experience. They were given a coding guideline outlining 
important principles and containing examples of both typical and difficult coding 
decisions. They then completed a rating form for each participant (See Appendix C for 
rater sheet and guidelines). 
The Most Recent Dream reports were rated as follows: 
Does the dream contain a realistic physical threat to the dreamer? 
If yes 
Is the threat life-threatening? 
Does the dreamer escape the threat? 
Is the escape realistic? 
Is the threat ancestral or modem? 
YesINo 
YesINo 
Yes!No 
Yes!No 
YesINo 
For training purposes, raters were initially given a small sample of dream reports from 
another source to rate, and percentage of perfect agreement was calculated at 91.5%. 
Domhoff (1996) recommends this stringent method of estimating agreement between 
raters when coding dream content. Percentage of perfect agreement is calculated by 
dividing the number of agreements by the total number of agreements and disagreements 
for each item. It calculates 'the percentage of times raters agree on the number and types 
of specific elements occurring in each dream' (Domhoff, 1996, p.28). If only coding 
totals are compared, similar totals could be the result of different decisions about specific 
items. Percentage of perfect agreement thus gives a better idea of absolute agreement 
between raters. 
The raters then coded the descriptions of real life threats reported by the participants on 
the following dimensions: 
1: Actual threats: Immediate real possibility of death/severe harm; the person had good reason to believe 
that they could be killed/severely harmed. 
2: Indefinite threats: Report simply of a vague, indefinite threat 
3: No description given. 
4: No physical threat present. 
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The real life threat descriptions were then rated as ancestral or modem. The ancestral 
threat category included assault, rape, mugging, theft, and attacks with weapons. 
Following a decision from a previous study (Maicolm"Smith & Solms, 2004) threats 
involving guns were coded as ancestral: the rationale being that being threatened with a 
gun or shot at is similar to being threatened with any deadly weapon (e.g. spears or 
arrows). This decision is consistent with Revonsuo's (2000a) inclusion of traumatic 
dreams of these types of events as evidence for his theory. The modem threat category 
included major surgery, traffic accidents, airplane disasters, carjackings, and court"related 
death threats. 
Raters again initially performed a training exercise on a small sample of data from 
another source, and the percentage of perfect agreement obtained was 87%. 
Finally, descriptions of dreams subsequent to life~threatening experiences were rated as 
follows: 
Did the dreamer escape the threat? YesINo 
Descriptions of dreams subsequent to real life-positive experiences were rated as follows: 
Is the content of the dream 
A: Positive 
B: Negative 
Percentage of perfect agreement on the training sample for these ratings was calculated as 
89.3% 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Analysis of the data indicates, firstly, that patterns of self-reported exposure to life-threats 
in the form of violent crime, match that of official crime statistics. South Africans have 
the highest exposure to these threats, while Welsh participants have the lowest exposure. 
Secondly, analysis of threat in MRD reports indicates that it occurs most often in reports 
from Welsh participants, and that escapes occur extremely infrequently in all three 
contexts. Thirdly, positive events seem to impact on dream content in a very similar 
manner to threat events. 
Exposure to threat across the samples 
It is critical to check that I am not subscribing to an ecological fallacy: assuming that 
participants are actually exposed to crime along the lines indicated by the crime statistics 
for the different contexts, particularly given the high number of white participants in the 
SA sample. Participants were thus requested to indicate whether their lives had ever been 
in danger and to describe the incident. Incidents which occurred in 2000 or later, and 
which were rated as ancestral type threats were analyzed. According to Revonsuo, 
modern threats, like traffic accidents, cannot be expected to impact on the threat 
simulation mechanism in any consistent manner; and they cannot be expected to cue 
efficient simulations. Experiences of modern threats should thus be irrelevant to dream 
content. The ancestral threat category contains the threats that constitute violent crime 
(viz. murder, rape, assault and robbery); that is, threats that are ecologically valid in terms 
of Rev on suo's argument. 
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Table 7: Rate of Exposure to Life Threatening Events 
Sample 
Western Cape 
North Wales 
Tuskegee 
Life Threat 
58 
49.15% 
14 
20.59% 
5 
22.73% 
No Life Threat 
60 
50.85% 
54 
79.41% 
17 
77.27% 
49% of SA participants reported having experienced an ancestral-type life-threatening 
event during the past 4 years, compared to 23% of US, and 21 % of Welsh participants 
(See Table 7). Chi-square analysis indicated a significantly unequal distribution of 
exposure to threat across the groups (X2[2,N:208] = 17.25, P < 0.0002; Cramer's V = 0.29); 
and analysis of standardized residuals indicated where the significant differences lie. 
More South Africans reported experiencing a life threat, while fewer than expected 
reported not experiencing one. The pattern for Welsh participants is diametrically 
opposite: fewer reports of life threatening experiences, and more reports than expected of 
never having had their life endangered (See Table 8). 
Table 8: Locating the source ofthe difference - Analysis of Standardized Residuals 
Sample Real Life Threat No Real Ufe Threat 
Western Cape 
Std Residual 2.1662 -1.6608 
P 0.0152 0.0484 
North Wales 
Std Residual -2.2269 1.7073 
P 0.0130 0.0439 
Tuskegee 
Std ReSidual -1.1018 0.8447 
p 0.1353 0.1991 
The pattern of self-reported exposure to threats which are ecologically valid in terms of 
Revonsuo's argument thus does match that indicated by the crime statistics. South 
Africans face significantly more threats~ while Welsh participants face significantly 
fewer. 
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The size of this significant effect is indicated by Cramer's V (0.29), but although this is 
conventionally used as the measure of association for Chi-square, interpreting it can be 
problematic. There are no published rules of thumb outlining what constitutes a small, 
medium or large effect (Lachenicht, 2002). Calculating the odd's ratio, however, can 
give a very clear idea of the extent of a variable's influence (Howell, 2002). In this 
instance, the odds of recent exposure to a life-threatening experience, given that the 
participant is South African, are 58/60. The odds for a Welsh participant are 14/54. The 
odd's ratio (SA/Wales) = 3.7. This tells us that South Africans are almost four times 
more likely than Welsh participants to have been exposed to a recent ancestral type life-
threatening event. 
Furthermore, the data generated by asking participants to list the types of threats they 
face routinely was analyzed specifically for mention of crime. Several participants did 
not complete this section, so meticulous quantitative analysis would be inappropriate. 
Only a rough impression of subjective sense of threat can be garnered from this data. 
What is important to note is that this question was specifically phrased so as not to cue 
primarily crime reports (See Appendix B). Participants were asked to list any and all 
physical threats they might encounter on a weekly basis (e.g. traffic hazards; sports 
injuries; etc). 'Crime' was simply one of several listed examples, and was not elaborated 
any further. This was thus an open-ended question designed to elicit spontaneous 
reporting of any threats that might be of current concern to the participants. 
There were 4 listings of crime threats from US participants (n = 34); 15 from Welsh 
participants (n = 116); and 199 from South African participants (n 208). The sense of 
threat from crime appears disproportionately high in the South African sample. 
The crime threats cited by Welsh participants were 'Crime' (3x); 'Murder' (Ix); and 
'Assault' (11x). US participants listed 'Assault' (2x) and 'Being shot' (2x). South 
African participants listed 'Crime' (17x); 'Murder' (4x); 'Assault' (55x); Rape (22x); 
'Being shot' (6x); 'Being hijacked' (23x); 'Being stabbed' (4x); 'Taxi violence'* (2x); 
'Being mugged' (46x); 'Being robbed' (13x); and 'Train violence'* (7x). Thus it would 
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appear that South Africans' sense of threat from crime is also elevated in terms of a 
proliferation of types of crime threats perceived. Additionally, note the level of violence 
inherent in the threats listed by South Africans. 
Thus it seems that both in terms of objective threat experiences and subjective sense of 
threat, the profile of threat exposure for the groups echoes that found in the crime 
statistics for the Western Cape and North Wales. The US sample does seem to fall in 
between, although its results for this section are closer to the Welsh sample. It can be 
regarded as established that the two critical samples differ in terms of exposure to 
ecologically valid threat cues, with South Africa being a high threat context, and Wales 
being a low threat context. 
*[Note: Taxi violence generally involves fatal shootings as competing owners battle for turf; 
passengers/passersby get caught in the crossfire. Train violence in the Western Cape often involves the 
victim being thrown from the train, resulting in death or dismemberment]. 
Threat content in Most Recent Dream reports 
Revonsuo explicitly predicts that a gradient should be found, in which the threat 
simulation mechanism should be particularly active in people living in conditions of 
exposure to ecologically valid threat cues; and relatively inactive in people living in 
conditions where these cues are not prevalent. This section thus looks at the proportion 
of threats present in Most Recent Dream (MRD) reports from participants who live in 
different threat contexts. The logic of Revonsuo' s argument suggests that we should be 
specifically examining the operation of ancestral threat in dreams - modem threats 
should be rare, and the simulation mechanism cannot be expected to handle them 
effectively. In this and all subsequent MRD analyses, therefore, only threats coded as 
ancestral are included. This analysis looks at all MRD threats coded as realistic physical 
threats to the dreamer. 'Realistic' was defined as anything that could conceivably occur 
in real life, either currently or in our ancestral past. 
52 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
Gender differences in Realistic Physical Threat in MRD reports: 
Because the Hall and Van de Castle dream content norms indicate a gender difference in 
aggression (Domhoff, 1996: males have more aggressive interactions), it is important to 
check whether there is a gender difference in incidence of realistic physical threats in 
MRD reports. Our previous study (Malcolm-Smith & Solms, 2004) and Revonsuo and 
Valli's (2000) work indicated no gender difference, and the current results confirm this. 
No significant differences were found within the samples from SA (X2[1,N=1851 0.88, P < 
0.3474); Wales (X2[l,N=102] = 0.78, P < 0.3779); or the US (Fisher's Exact test, I-tailed; p 
= 0.6103). Males and females are thus equally likely to report realistic physical threats in 
their dreams, so having a preponderance of female participants in all groups will have no 
impact on the MRD analysis. 
Realistic Physical Threat in MRD reports across threat contexts: 
The results indicate that the MRD reports of Welsh participants contained the highest 
frequency of realistic physical threats (18.63%), followed by US participants (11.11%). 
South African MRD reports contained the fewest realistic physical threats at 8.65% (See 
Table 9). 
Table 9: Incidence of Realistic Physical Threat in MRD Reports 
Sample 
Realistic Physical No Realistic 
Threat Phy.sical Threat 
Western Cape 16 169 
8.65% 91.35% 
North Wales 19 83 
18.63% 81.37% 
Tuskegee 3 24 
11.11% 88.89% 
Chi-square analysis established that the distribution of MRD threats across the groups 
differed significantly (X2[2,N=314j = 6.18; P < 0.0455; Cramer's V= 0.14). Analysis of 
standardized residuals indicated the difference lies in the Welsh sample - significantly 
more realistic physical dream threats than expected were reported by this group (See 
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Table 10). Note the value for the South African group: MRD reports of realistic physical 
threats were on the low end of the distribution. Thus the group living in the least 
threatening context reported the highest proportion of ancestral threat dreams. The 
gradient evidenced by these results is the exact opposite of that predicted by Revonsuo. 
Once again, the odd's ratio can clarify the extent of the difference between the groups: 
the odds of having a realistic physical threat in dreams, given that the participant is 
Welsh, are 19/83~ while those for SA participants are 16/169. The odd's ratio 
(Wales/SA) 2.4. Welsh participants are thus two and a half times more likely to have 
realistic physical threats in their dreams. 
Table 10: Locating the Source of Significant Difference in Incidence of 
Realistic Physical Threats in MRD reports. 
Sample 
Realistic Physical No Realistic 
Threat PhYSical Threat 
Western Cape 
Std Residuals -1.3500 0.5010 
P 0.0884 0.3082 
North Wales 
Std Residuals 1.8945 -0.7030 
P 0.0291 0.2410 
Tuskegee 
Std Residuals -0.1480 0.0549 
P 0.4412 0.4781 
Life-threats in MRD reports: 
It is still possible in terms of Revonsuo's arguments, that life-threatening events, rather 
than simply physical threats, occur with greater frequency in the group exposed to the 
most waking threat cues. Examples of MRD threats coded as life-threatening include 
dreaming of being shot in both legs; of having severe head inj uries; and of being shot in 
the back by a robber. Examples of MRD threats coded as not life-threatening include the 
dreamer's dog acting angry but not doing anything specific; being sworn at and punched 
( once); and being slapped. 
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Table 11 indicates that South Africa once again had the fewest life~threats in their MRD 
reports (7.03%), while Wales again had the most (12.75%). This time, however, the 
difference between the groups was not found to be statistically significant (X.2[2.N=314] 
2.73; P < 0.2554). 
Table 11: MRD Realistic Physical Threats rated as Lif~threatening 
Life Threatening No Life Threatening 
Sample Realistic Physical Realistic Physical 
Threats Threats 
Western Cape 13 172 
7.03% 92.97% 
North Wales 13 89 
12.75% 87.25% 
Tuskegee 2 25 
7.41 92.5<)010 
Realistic Escapes from Realistic Physical Threats in MRD reports: 
Table 12 indicates how many realistic escapes occurred from realistic physical threats. 
Most dream threats (between 75% & 100%) were not followed by a realistic escape. In 
these cases, either the escape is unrealistic; or the threat overwhelms the dreamer and no 
response is recorded; or the dreamer wakes up in fright. Escapes coded as unrealistic 
include the dreamer being shot in both legs, but seeing no blood, feeling no pain, and 
being able to walk normally; and the dreamer operating on himself. Examples of no 
effective response include: the dream ends with the dreamer being shot in the back by 
armed robbers; the dreamer cannot escape pursuers; the dreamer is unable to move in the 
presence of a burglar; the dreamer is robbed and shot 6 times in the back; the dreamer 
drowns in a flood; and the dreamer is caught by a crocodile and drowns. Examples of the 
dreamer waking up in fright include: the dreamer is shot at in a crujacking, and wakes up 
just before the bullet hits his face; the dreamer wakes up during pursuit; a threatening 
stranger looms and the dreamer wakes up; the dreamer's sister threatens to stab and kill 
her and the dreamer wakes up. 
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Examples of escapes coded as realistic include: a shark attacks the dreamer's boyfriend 
and she escapes by abandoning him and swimming for shore; the dreamer's boyfriend 
shoots a menacing lion; escaping a farm attack by driving off in a car~ and escaping 
pursuers by getting on a train. 
Table 12: Incidence of Realistic Escape from Realistic Physical Threats 
Unrealistic or No 
Sample Realistic Escape 
Escape 
Western 4 12 
25.00% 75.00% 
North Wales 2 17 
10.53% 89.47% 
Tuskegee 0 3 
100% 
A cross sample comparison using chi-square is not advisable due to low expected 
frequencies « 5) in four of the six cells. The US was thus excluded from the analysis, 
and Fisher's Exact Test was conducted on the SA and Wales groups. This test is 
recommended in cases where low expected frequencies render Chi-square unreliable 
(Howell, 2002). For 2 x 2 tables, it calculates the exact probability of obtaining cell 
frequencies as uneven as those observed. No difference was found between the groups (p 
0.2478; 1- tailed). Expressed as a proportion of the total, 2.16% of SA MRD reports; 
1.96% of Welsh MRD reports; and 0% of US MRD reports contained realistic escapes 
from realistic physical threats. 
Summary: Analysis of threat content in Most Recent Dream reports 
The first coding indicates that most dreams do not contain realistic physical threats to the 
dreamer: between 81 % (North Wales) and 91 % (South Africa) of dreams were coded as 
not containing realistic physical threats. Welsh participants report significantly more 
realistic physical threats than the other groups (X2[2,N=314] = 6.18; P < 0.0455~ Cramer's V= 
0.14): they are two and a half times more likely to report realistic physical threats than 
South Africans. 
56 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The second coding indicates that very few dreams contain life-threatening physical 
threats to the dreamer: between 87.25% (Wales) and 92.97% (SA) of dreams were coded 
as not containing life-threatening events. 12.75% of Welsh MRD reports; 7.41% of US 
MRD reports; and 7.03% of SA MRD reports contained life-threatening realistic physical 
threats to the dreamer. There is no difference in the distribution across the groups 
(X.2[2,N=314] = 2.73; P < 0.2554). 
The third coding indicates that most realistic physical dream threats are not followed by a 
realistic escape, and that there is no difference in this trend across the SA and Wales 
groups (Fisher's Exact Test: p = 0.2478, I-tailed; n 35). In terms of the entire sample, 
2.16% of SA MRD reports contain realistic escapes from realistic physical threats, a 
similar figure to the 1.96% reported in Welsh MRD's. 
Examining and comparing dreams subsequent to 
threatening and positive life experiences. 
Life-threatening events and subsequent dreams: 
TST predicts that experiencing life-threatening events should activate the dream threat 
simulation mechanism, cueing recurrent dream simulation/rehearsal of the threat. 
Participants were thus asked if their life had ever been in danger; and if so, to provide the 
date and a detailed description of the incident. They were also asked if they subsequently 
dreamed of the event. Real life experiences which raters coded as Actual threats (i.e. 
confirmed that there was danger of death to the participant), and which occurred during 
or after 2000, were further investigated. 
104 reports were confirmed as actual recent life-threatening events. Contrary to what 
TST would predict, it was found that the majority (almost 2/3rds ) of these participants did 
not report later dreaming of the life-threatening event they had experienced (See Table 
13). Examples of events coded as actual threats, which were not followed by dream 
57 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
simulations include: having a knife held to the participant's throat while being robbed 
(this occurred 3 days prior to filling in the questionnaire); a burglar threatening to shoot 
the participant (1 yr prior); being threatened and severely beaten by gangsters (3yrs 
prior); being mugged by 5 men with knives (4 mths prior); being burgled by men 
wielding axes and knives (2 yrs prior); and having a gun held to the participant's head (2 
reports: 2 yrs prior & 1 yr prior). 
Table 13: Reports of Dreams Following Actual Threat Experiences 
Total 
Sample 
Count 
% 
Subsequent 
Dream 
38 
36.54% 
No Subsequent 
Dream 
66 
63.46% 
These Actual threats were further coded as Modem or Ancestral. TST predicts that 
ancestral threats in particular should activate the threat simulation mechanism. Thus it is 
important to investigate whether ancestral life-threatening events are more likely to be 
followed by dream simulations than modern threats. All the examples listed in the 
previous section were coded as ancestral threats. Modern life-threatening events 
predominantly involved car accidents. No significant difference was found in incidence 
of dreams subsequent to ancestral rather than modem life-threatening experiences across 
the entire sample (X.2[l.N=1041 0.808, P < 0.3687; see Table 14); or within the samples 
from different threat contexts (SA: X.2[1.N=641 = 1.96, P < 0.1619; Wales: X.2ll.N=341 = 0.02, P 
< 0.8766; US: Fisher's Exact Test, p 0.8, I-tailed). 
Table 14: Reports of Dreams Following Modern and Ancestral Actual Threat Experiences 
Threat Subsequent No Subsequent 
Type Dream Dream 
Modem 19 39 
32.76% 67.24% 
Ancestral 19 27 
41.30% 58.70% 
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TST predicts that dream simulations of actual severe threat experiences should feature an 
appropriate response from the dreamer. Participants who did report dreaming of the life-
threatening event they had experienced were asked to provide a detailed example of such 
a dream. 27 of the 38 participants who reported later dreaming of actual threat 
experiences recorded example dreams. Raters examined these reports to ascertain 
whether an escape from the threat was present. Table 15 indicates that in 85% of these 
cases, an escape from the threat did not occur. 
Table 15: Incidence of Escape in Dreams Following Actual Threat Experiences 
Total Sample Escape No escape 
4 23 
% 14.82% 85.18% 
There were only 4 instances (15%) of escape from the threat in subsequent dreams. 1) A 
participant reported breaking up with an abusive boyfriend, who then came back and 
raped her. She reports subsequently dreaming of this, and that in some of her dreams she 
beats him up or 'gets away somehow'. 2) A participant reported being robbed at 
knifepoint by 2 men; but he managed to hit the one and run away. In his subsequent 
dreams he reports beating both their heads into the pavement, and kicking them until they 
are dead. 3) A participant reported nearly being involved in a serious car accident, 
having to swerve to avoid a truck. She then reports dreaming of a similar near-miss 
accident. 4) A participant reported experiencing severe turbulence during a flight. 
People fell over, someone collapsed and there was panic in the cabin. In her dream, she 
reports similar scenes 'like the movies', but that she somehow escapes. Note that in three 
out of four cases, the escape initially occurred in the real life event, and then also features 
in subsequent dreams. 
In 85% of example dreams, an escape from the dream threat did not occur. Examples of 
dreams in which an escape did not occur follow: 1) A participant was harassed by a group 
of men wanting sex; which she refused. They became aggressive, breaking her friend's 
car window in an attempt to get at her. In her subsequent dream, they approach her 
again, but she cannot run and cannot call out for help. She is terrified of being shot. 2) A 
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participant reported driving too fast, being unable to brake in time, and thus having an 
accident. In her subsequent dreams, she cannot reach the brakes, or they do not work 
properly. 3) A participant reported having a head-on collision~ her subsequent dream 
features the sound of the cars hitting and the sight of her friend's body being thrown 
about. 4) A participant reported being burgled, and subsequently dreams that the men 
will come back, particularly when she is alone and helpless. 5) A waitress reported being 
held up at gunpoint in an armed robbery~ she reports now dreaming of the gunman's face. 
This image intrudes into many dreams. 6) A surfer reported nearly drowning in big surf 
and subsequently dreams of that situation, only the waves are 'the size of 10 storey 
buildings'; he dreams of the panic he experienced in real life. 
The tendency not to escape the dream threat appears to be similar across the different 
groups. Cell sizes were extremely low for this analysis (expected frequencies < 5 in four 
of the six cells; see Table 16). The US sample was thus dropped, and Fisher's Exact Test 
shows no difference between the SA and Wales groups (p = 0.6759, I-tailed). 
Table 16: Escape in Dreams Following Actual Life-Threatening Experiences Across Samples 
Sample Escape No Escape 
Western Cape 3 17 
15.00% 85.00% 
North Wales 1 5 
16.67% 83.33% 
Tuskegee 0 1 
0.00% 100.00% 
Real Life Positive Events and Subsequent Dreams: 
Revonsuo states that only experiencing threat impacts on dream content in any consistent 
way. He hypothesizes that no other class of event will be found to impact on dream 
content. In order to check the veracity of this claim, participants were asked whether 
they had ever had an overwhelmingly positive or exhilarating life experience and to 
describe it. They were then asked if they had later dreamed of this event. Positive events 
that occurred in 2000 or later were included in this analysis. Many participants (41%) 
reported that they did dream of positive events after they had occurred (See Table 17). 
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TabJe 17: Reports of Dreams Following Positive Events 
Total Sample Dream No Dream 
Count 
% 
99 
40.91% 
143 
59.09% 
Revonsuo (2000a) has cited Hartmann (1998), claiming that positive events are dreamed 
of in terms of what can go wrong with them: that is, even dreams of positive events 
become threat simulations. Thus, in order to check whether the dreams of positive events 
in our sample were in fact threat simulations, the content of the reported dreams was 
rated as either positive or negative. Sixty-five participants provided examples of dreams 
of positive events. Contrary to Revonsuo and Hartmann, Table 18 indicates the 
overwhelming preponderance (91 %) of content in these dreams was rated as positive. 
Only 9% of example dreams featured anxieties related to the event, or things going 
wrong. Examples of dreams rated as positive include: dreaming of graduating, feeling 
the pride and joy of accomplishment; dreaming of flying home and visiting family, 
'enjoying every minute of it'; dreaming of a very positive sexual experience~ and 
dreaming of a very successful wrestling match, of the crowd's support and of winning. 
Table 18: Are Dreams of Positive Events Positive or Negative in Nature? 
Total Sample Positive Negative 
59 6 
% 90.77% 9.23% 
Comparing reports of dreams subsequent to threat events with reports of dreams 
subsequent to positive events: 
Even though it appears that some participants later dream of positive events, and that 
these dreams are positive in nature, it is still possible, as Revonsuo contends, that threat 
experiences are more likely to lead to simulation dreams and that only threat dreams 
recur. A comparison was thus conducted to check these possibilities. Once again, only 
events that occurred in 2000 or later were included in the analysis. No difference was 
found in self-report of dreams following life-threatening rather than positive life 
experiences (X2[1,1V=389] 0.17, P < 0.6772). Participants were thus as likely to report later 
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dreaming of positive events as they were to report dreaming of threatening events (See 
Table 19). 
Table 19: Dreams FoUowing Life-threatening and Positive Life Experiences. 
Real Life Real Life 
Threat Experience Positive Experience 
Dream of event 57 99 
% 38.78% 40.91% 
No Dream of event 90 143 
% 61.22% 59.0golo 
Participants were also asked to estimate how many times they dreamed of either type of 
event. Dreams of both life-threatening events and positive events were reported to have 
recurred, and the mean estimates of recurrence were similar. The mean number of times 
participants estimated having dreamed of positive events after they happened was 8.94 
times, while the mean number of times participants estimated having later dreamed of 
threatening events was 7.24. It is not likely that these estimates are highly accurate: the 
intention of this comparison is simply to indicate that positive events also seem to be 
dreamed of subsequent to their occurrence; and they seem to be dreamed of recurrently. 
Contrary to Revonsuo's assertions, the self-reports about dreams following from positive 
events are remarkably similar to those about dreams following from life-threatening 
events. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
Overview of the results 
Threat in dreams of participants from different threat contexts: 
The most important aspect of the present study is this: an investigation of Revonsuo's 
claim that the threat simulation mechanism will activate differently depending on the 
level of ecologically valid threat cues operational in waking life. The different levels of 
exposure to ecologically valid threats in the three samples were established - firstly by 
examining official statistics for violent crime; secondly by ascertaining the proportion of 
participants in each sample who reported experiencing a recent ancestral-type life-
threatening event; and thirdly by obtaining an impression of the participants' subjective 
sense of relevant threats faced routinely. The participants' responses confirmed the 
pattern indicated by the crime statistics. The SA sample is exposed to a significantly 
higher level of threat, while the sample from Wales has a significantly lower level of 
threat exposure. South Africans were four times more likely to have been exposed to a 
recent ancestral-type life-threatening event than Welsh participants. 
This data provides a firm foundation for testing Revonsuo's arguments. South Africans 
are exposed to ecologically valid threat cues, so the threat simulation mechanism should 
be activated in this context. According to his prediction of a gradient of activation, the 
dreams of South African participants should thus contain the most threats, with US and 
then Welsh dreams containing fewer. The results indicate precisely the opposite pattern 
to that predicted: Welsh participants had significantly more realistic physical threats in 
their dreams than the other groups. They were two and a half time more likely to have 
realistic physical threats in their dreams than South Africans. Inexplicably, in terms of 
TST, the group living in conditions virtually free from ancestral threat had the most threat 
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simulation dreams, while those living with a fairly high prevalence of ancestral threat 
cues, had the least. 
Welsh participants also reported the most life-threats in their dreams (12.75%), followed 
by the US (7.41%), and with South Africans again reporting the least dream threats 
(7.03%). The difference between the groups was not found to be significant. There was 
also no difference across the SA and Wales groups in the rate of escape from dream 
threats. There is thus no indication of more dream life-threats or escapes occurring in the 
high threat exposure sample. Revonsuo' s prediction of a gradient of activation in the 
threat simulation mechanism, dependent on the level of exposure to ecologically valid 
cues, is not supported. 
This MRD content analysis clearly tells us that most dreams do not contain realistic 
physical threats to the dreamer. Although the Welsh participants' MRD reports 
contained significantly more realistic physical threats than the other groups, even in this 
sample 81 % of MRD reports were threat free. In the SA sample, 91 % of reports did not 
contain realistic physical threats. This confirms our previous finding (Malcolm-Smith & 
Solms, 2004) and is similar to Revonsuo & Valli's (2000) report that only 22% of dream 
threats were coded as physically dangerous or life-threatening. These figures all clearly 
indicate that most dream content does not feature physical threats. Furthermore, life-
threats in MRD reports seldom occurred - between 87% and 93% of dreams did not 
contain life-threats. These results contradict both the impression given by Revonsuo's 
review of empirical evidence under Proposition 2; and the conclusions derived in 
Revonsuo and Valli (2000): namely, that dreams specialize in representing threats 
relevant to his argument. 
Critically, most of the few dream threats that did occur were not followed by an escape. 
Between 75% and 100% of all MRD threats were not successfully resolved in the dream. 
This is the most critical aspect of Rev on suo's proposed function for dreams. The threat 
mechanism cannot provide adaptive advantage simply through rehearsal of threat 
experiences: successful avoidance responses must also occur. Only simulations of escape 
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can lead to improved perfonnance in real life. Domhoff (2003a) also adopts this position, 
arguing that a having a dream reflect a problem is one thing; having it reflect a solution is 
another entirely. The escape figures cited here, and those indicated in our 2004 study 
(2.74%) seem far too low to provide support for this theory of function. 
Dreams subsequent to threatening and positive life experiences: 
The aim here was to explore participants' reports of dreams subsequent to positive life 
events, and to see if these were in any way similar to their reports of dreams subsequent 
to threatening events. TST states that only experiencing threat impacts on dream content; 
and that if it can be shown otherwise, this would constitute proof against the theory 
(Revonsuo,2000a). 
Only one third of participants who experienced a recent life-threatening event reported 
dreaming of this experience. Experiences coded as ancestral were no more likely to be 
followed by dream simulations than those coded as modern. Both these results contradict 
TST's predictions. In dreams of actual life-threatening experiences, 85% of the time the 
dream threat was not followed by a successful escape - the dreamers simply relived the 
terror of the experience. In the four instances (15%) where a dream escape did occur, 
three of the escapes had initially occurred in real life. In terms of TST, these dreams 
would thus constitute rehearsals of skills already functioning adaptively in waking life. 
41 % of respondents who reported experiencing an overwhelmingly positive experience 
said they later dreamed of this event. Of the dream examples provided, raters coded 91 % 
as having only positive content. The participants relived the joy and exhilaration they 
experienced in real life. Some participants did report 'post-triumphant dreams' - entities 
that Revonsuo (2000b, p.1065) confidently asserts do not exist. Moreover, no difference 
was found in rate of reporting dreams subsequent to threatening events rather than 
positive events. Participants' estimates of the recurrence of both types of dreams were 
also remarkably similar: the mean estimate of recurrence for threat dreams was 7.24 
times, and that for positive events was 8.94 times. According to these results, it appears 
that people do dream of intensely positive emotional events in the same way that they 
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dream of threatening events - sometimes dreams recreate the experience, and sometimes 
these dreams recur. 
Clearly, retrospective self-report data is not entirely reliable, and confirmation of these 
findings using a prospective design would be most valuable. However, I would like to 
put forward two comments suggested by these results. Firstly, the idea espoused by 
Revonsuo that trauma is usually followed by recurrent dreams incorporating that event, 
may not be entirely accurate. Recent research shows that literal incorporation of the 
threat event in dreams is not the rule (Hartmann, 1998; Hartmann & Basile, 2003; 
Mellman et aI., 2001; Punamaki, 1997; 1999). 
I suggest this particular belief regarding the incorporation of threat events into dreams 
may have been based largely on data from a biased sample: namely, people in treatment 
for post-traumatic symptoms. Due to this, we may have subscribed to a retrospective 
fallacy. This type of retrospective error, which overestimates the base rate of the 
occurrence of a relationship, is a quite common logical error. The best known example, 
of course, comes from looking at prison populations in the US, where most offenders are 
black. This gives the relationship: most offenders -7 black, but not its reciprocal, i.e. it 
does not mean that most blacks -7 offenders. Similarly, in the literature on child abuse, it 
was initially found that parents currently abusing their children retrospectively reported 
having been abused themselves, and this led to the idea of the cycle of abuse. The 
relationship: abusers -7 previously abused was inverted to become: abused -7 abusers. 
Prospective studies later indicated that not all children who are abused go on to become 
abusers - there is no straightforward relationship of abuse -7 abuse (Kaufman & Zigler, 
1993; Quinton & Rutter, 1988; Widom, 1989). 
Perhaps a similar situation arose in the literature on trauma and dreams. People suffering 
from PTSD, who repeatedly dream of particular threat events, obviously tend to 
retrospectively report having been traumatized (i.e. threat incorporation dreams -7 
previously traumatized). It seems this is how the relationship of trauma events being 
incorporated into dream content was established - the relationship was inverted (trauma 
66 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
n
-7 threat incorporation dreams). Now, looking prospectively at what happens to dreams 
post-trauma, we see that this relationship is not a given. Although it seems clear that 
dreams become more emotionally intense after trauma (Hartmann & Basile, 2003; 
Hartmann et aI., 2001), many people who are traumatized do not experience literal 
simulations of the event in their dreams. Moreover, those who do tend to have poorer 
psychological adjustment (Levin & Basile, 2003; Mellman et aI., 2001); which again 
suggests that the 'in-treatment' sample is likely to be biased. The base rate of trauma -7 
incorporation dreams cannot be accurately estimated by looking primarily at this sample. 
Secondly, I suggest these results indicate that we need to investigate the impact of 
positive events on dream content. I was unable to find a single published study on this 
particular subject, and G.W. Domhoff and M. Blagrove (personal communications; 17th 
and 18th November 2004, respectively) indicated that they were not aware of any research 
conducted on this topic. There are some studies that indirectly indicate that positive life 
events may have an impact on dream content, but they do not specifically examine dream 
content subsequent to positive life experiences. For example, Blagrove & Price (2000) 
found that happy skilled individuals tend to have happy dreams. A study by Van den 
Bulk (2004) found that 60% of thirteen year olds and 50% of sixteen year olds report 
pleasant dreams related to material seen on TV. Kelly Bulkeley (personal 
communication on work in prep., 18th November, 2004) has found instances of dreams 
reflecting a positive waking event. This gap in the literature means that Revonsuo's 
confident assertions concerning the unique impact of threat on dream content are based 
only on assumption - there is currently no basis for comparison. 
What is needed is a good prospective study examining the impact of exhilarating or 
overwhelmingly positive events on dreams, and ideally, comparing this to the impact of 
trauma on dreams. The current study was unable to shed any light on exactly what kind 
of positive experience tends to lead to dreams. Would these be biologically relevant 
events? There was no clear pattern in the current data. Some people reported dreaming 
of wonderful experiences in nature hikes; swims; scenery; others reported dreaming of 
highly meaningful events graduations; reunions; intimacy. Others reported not 
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dreaming of very similar experiences. This direction of investigation needs to be 
pursued. 
Limitations 
Although the sample sizes from SA and Wales, the two most critical contexts, were large 
enough to be reliable, the US sample, intended to be used as a calibration point between 
these groups, was unfortunately too small. In two instances it had to be excluded from 
statistical analyses. Its small size also casts doubt on it being representative of this 
population. In terms of purely descriptive statistics, the percentages obtained for the US 
group did generally fall between those for the SA and Wales groups - it is a pity these 
figures cannot safely be regarded as reliable estimates. Fortunately the sample sizes for 
the critical contrasts between the most divergent threat contexts, SA and Wales, were 
sufficient. 
Another area of concern is the possibility of limited power. In two of the MRD analyses, 
there appeared to be a difference between the groups, but this was not found to be 
statistically significant. 1) MRD reports from Welsh participants contained the most life-
threats (12.75%), while those from SA contained the least (7.03%) - this difference was 
not significant. In this instance the MRD sample sizes should be sufficient (Wales: n = 
102; SA: n = 185), unless the effect size is very small (Domhoff, 2003b), which would 
appear to be a possibility. 
2) MRD reports from SA participants appeared to contain more escapes (25%) than those 
from Welsh participants (10.53%), and this difference was not found to be significant. In 
this analysis, based on the number of escapes that occurred from MRD realistic physical 
threats, sample sizes were extremely small (SA: n = 16; Wales: n 19). There were two 
reported escapes from Welsh participants and four from South African participants. If 
these figures were treated as proportions of the total MRD samples, rather than as 
proportions of MRD realistic physical threats, there is even less difference between the 
groups. Obtaining a large enough sample of MRD escapes to enable statistically 
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satisfactory analysis of differences between groups would not be easy. Given that escapes 
from realistic physical threats in dreams seem to occur in around 2% or less of MRD 
reports (Malcolm-Smith & Solms, 2004; current results); getting a sample of only 50 
escapes would require around 2 500 MRD reports, clearly a daunting task. It seems to 
me that the mere fact that realistic escape from realistic physical threat occurs so 
infrequently as to cause these problems suggests that basing a theory of function for 
dreaming on this rare element is somewhat questionable. 
Using only students as participants is also somewhat problematic - they can hardly be 
regarded as representative of the broader population. Clearly this is primarily due to a 
pragmatic issue of access: university classes provide large numbers of potential 
participants, an important consideration. Obtaining large samples of completed surveys 
is no easy feat: many people do not recall their dreams, or simply do not have the time to 
participate. Note, however, that Revonsuo (2000a; 2000b) asserts that the threat 
mechanism should be optimally active in children and adolescents, partly because of the 
short life span of ancestral humans, but also because he hypothesizes that in younger 
humans, the conditions of modem living have had less impact, and ancestral dream 
scripts should be more active. In addition, Domhoff (2003b) has shown that older 
individuals' dream content does not differ, except that aggression and negative emotions 
are reduced. Student samples can thus be considered appropriate in terms of age. The 
most important antidote to non-random sampling is aiming for replication of results 
(Cook & Campbell, 1989). The current results replicate our 2004 findings; the additional 
areas of investigation introduced in this study require replication in the future. 
Clearly, all the methodological problems inherent in the field of dream research 
(discussed in the literature review) apply to this study. Most importantly, we cannot be 
entirely certain about what dream recall biases exist, although it seems that salient, 
dramatic dreams tend to be remembered better. Domhoff (1996; 2003b) indicates that 
home reports result in more reports of aggression and misfortunes than do laboratory 
reports - this bias may impact on the present results. However, the possibility that these 
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biases have affected these results simply strengthens the argument against TST - despite 
biases favouring their recall, reports of threat simulation dreams are rare. 
Zadra and Donderi (2000b) report that retrospective estimates of nightmare frequency are 
much lower than their frequency in dream diaries. This could suggest a problem for the 
self-report data on whether a recent actual life-threatening experience was followed by a 
threat simulation dream - these might be under-reported. I would, however, contend that 
this question constitutes a very different scenario. The participants all remember the life-
threatening event in great detail; and post trauma dreams are usually considered highly 
emotional and memorable (Hartmann, 1998). Hence, asking about specific dreams of 
highly memorable events is very different from requesting an estimate of how many 
nightmares one might have had in a month. Nonetheless, all retrospective self-report data 
must be viewed with caution. 
Implications for TST 
As stated earlier, TST is not a theory that can be refuted by one simple test. The theory's 
six propositions give rise to many predictions. The predictions listed by Revonsuo 
(2000a) are clearly not exhaustive, but I will reflect on this data in relation to them. 
Proposition 6 states the theory - it rests on the validity of the preceding propositions. 
Proposition 1, which contends not only that dream experience is not random, but that it is 
a selective organized simulation of the world, seems untestable. The neural mechanisms 
underlying dreaming are not random, but this does not necessarily mean dreams are 
simulations. The current findings do have implications for the remaining propositions. 
Proposition 2 asserts that dreams specialize in simulating threatening events; and predicts 
these should be over-represented in dreams. The results indicate that relevant threats are 
few: between 81 % and 91 % of dreams feature no physical threats. Even fewer dreams 
contain life-threats. Threats are thus not over-represented in terms of dream content. 
Revonsuo also predicts that when activated by actual threats, the mechanism should more 
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efficiently simulate ancestral than modem threats. This data showed no such advantage: 
in dreams following actual recent life-threatening events, ancestral threats were no more 
likely to be followed by threat simulation dreams than were modem threats. The data 
thus contradict two of the three predictions derived by Revonsuo from Proposition 2. As 
discussed in the closing section of the literature review, this study cannot address the 
third prediction derived from Proposition 2: that dream threats are over-represented 
compared with threats in waking life. As mentioned previously, this aspect will be 
examined in a later paper (in preparation) that examines all biologically relevant events in 
dreams. 
Proposition 3 contends that real threatening events impact markedly on dream content. 
From this Revonsuo predicts that exposure to real-threats will activate the mechanism, 
and that the frequency and recurrence of dream simulations will depend on the degree of 
personal threat experienced. I found no evidence that exposure to ancestral threat cues 
activates the mechanism: South Africans had the least MRD threats (8.65%); and the 
least life-threats, despite living in a high threat context. Participants who experienced 
recent ancestral-type life-threatening events generally did not dream of them (63.46%). 
Revonsuo also predicts that no other class of event impacts on dreams in a similar fashion 
to threat. My data indicates that self-report of dreams subsequent to positive experiences 
is remarkably similar to that of dreams subsequent to threat experiences. A similar 
proportion of participants reported dreaming of both types of events, and these dreams 
seemed to recur to a similar extent. All three of these predictions are thus contradicted. 
Proposition 4 states that dream simulations efficiently rehearse both threat perception and 
avoidance responses, and from this Revonsuo predicts that in life-threatening dream 
events, the dreamer will be most likely to respond appropriately. My data does not 
support this threat avoidance responses in dreams seem to be the exception, rather than 
the rule. Hardly any escapes occur in MRD reports: South Africans report no more 
escapes despite living in context where the threat simulation mechanism should be active; 
and in dream reports subsequent to actual threatening experiences, escapes are few, and 
predominantly initially occurred during the actual threat experience. These results also 
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have implications for Proposition 5, which states that simulation of skills leads to 
enhanced performance in real life. Escapes are most often not being simulated, so no 
waking improvement can be expected. This is a problem for Revonsuo' s two-stage 
model of dream production. The second stage - the rapid selection of an avoidance 
response - tends not to occur. Revonsuo's analogy, likening the threat simulation 
mechanism to the human immune system, thus does not hold. He explicitly states that 
the critical factor in its selection was that it remembers the response to a particular 
pathogen, rendering future response far more efficient. We see little evidence for this in 
dreams. 
Conclusion 
TST's fundamental predictions are not supported by this empirical evidence. Moreover, 
the dearth of avoidance responses in dreams, combined with the suggestion that positive 
events impact markedly on dream content, constitute convincing evidence against TST's 
logical foundations. Revonsuo's focus on an evolutionary perspective should be 
acknowledged as potentially useful, but the domain of consideration must be broadened 
from the focus on fear/threat. Brain imaging studies (Braun et aI., 1997; Maquet et aI., 
1996; Nofzinger, Minton, Wiseman et aI., 1997) clearly indicate that our basic emotional 
circuitry is highly active during dreaming. Evolutionary ancient emotionally charged 
concerns, however, do not only involve threat - we should be examining all biologically 
significant events in dreams. 
Panksepp (2000) has raised an important point: REM structures are more ancient than the 
waking structures of the Extended Reticulo-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS). 
Panksepp hypothesizes: 
"The REM process may be the functional residue of an ancient fonn of waking a simple-minded 
fonn of emotional arousal that was 'reined in' through the evolution of REM-atonia as higher 
'post trigeminal' ERTAS systems prevailed over primordial pre-propositional fonns of waking. 
This would help explain why REM still arouses basic emotional processes and infuses affect into 
cognitively manifested dream deliberations ... REM arousal may reflect an ancient fonn of waking 
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arousal that was devoted largely to activating genetically ingrained emotional subroutines, which 
guided behavioral actions in ancestral species long before the behavioral flexibility provided by 
higher cerebral evolution. Those ancient, value-coding processes may still provide background 
operations that help higher brain mechanisms sift and integrate fundamental survival concerns 
from the Niagara of cognitive information flowing in from newly evolved forebrain regions" 
(p.989). 
It is remarkable to think that dream content research may perhaps shed some light on 
fundamental core-consciousness, now virtually inaccessible to us. This direction of 
investigation, focusing on all basic emotions and all biologically significant events, will 
be pursued in a forthcoming paper. 
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APPENDIX A 
Crime Statistics: Sources, Definitions 
and Calculations 
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CRIME STATISTICS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
WESTERN CAPE 
These statistics are based on figures released by the South African Police Services and 
collated/analyzed by the Institute for Security Studies. The ISS is an independent body 
funded by, among others, USAID; the Ford Foundation; and the British High 
Commission. One of its research areas is crime analysis, and it aims to provide a 
resource for both the public and the state. Crime Quarterly is an ISS electronic 
publication that presents statistics and analyses. 
Criminal Justice Monitor (2004). Crime Statistics released by the South African 
Police 20th September 2004. www.iss.co.zalCJM/stats0904Iindex.htm 
Western Province Provincial total 2003/04 
Murder 2839 
Rape 6315 
Attempted murder 3633 
AssaultlGBH 36912 
Aggravated robbery 13855 
Indecent Assault 2844 
Culpable Homicide 1252 
[Note: aggravated robbery means armed robbery] 
SA Totals 2003/04 
19824 
52733 
30076 
260082 
133658 
9302 
11096 
CALCULATING RATES PER 100000 FOR THE WESTERN CAPE 
AND SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE SAPS STATISTICS 
From Statistics SA (www.statssa.gov.sa) obtained a recent (i.e. mid 2004) population 
estimate for SA and for the Western Cape. 
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SA mid 2004 population: 
Western Cape 
46.6 million 
4570696 
Used these figures to calculate incidence per 100 000 on crimes that were presented only 
as totals in the ISS sources. 
Western Province Provincial total 2003/04 SA Totals 
Murder 2839 19824 
pllOO 000 62 43 
Rape 6315 52733 
pllOO 000 138 113 
Attempted murder 3633 30076 
pllOO 000 80 65 
AssaultlGBH 36912 260082 
pllOO 000 808 558 
Aggravated robbery 13855 133658 
p/lOO 000 303 287 
Indecent Assault 2844 9302 
pllOO 000 62 20 
Culpable Homicide 1252 11096 
pllOO 000 27 24 
CRIME STATISTICS FOR THE UK AND NORTH WALES 
These statistics were taken from the British Home Office webpage. 
Dodd, T.; Nicholas, S.; Povey, D.; & Walker, A. (2004). Crime in England and 
Wales 2003/2004. Home Office Research Development Statistics 
www.statistics.gov.uklrds/ 
This reports on the British Crime Survey (BCS), which combines reported crimes with 
interview data and analysis. 
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Violent Crime 
Includes violence, threat of violence and simple harassment. (Includes Violence against 
the person; Sexual Offences and Robbery). 
NNB: Neither Total violent crime nor Total violence against person can be used as 
indicator of violent crime - includes many categories aside from the usual murder. 
attempted murder, rape, assault/GBH and armed robbery. 
CATEGORIES COMPRISING TOTAL VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON 
MORE SERIOUS OFFENCES: 
Homicide (murder, manslaughter and infanticide) 
Attempted murder 
Threat or conspiracy to murder 
Child destruction 
Causing death by dangerous driving 
Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs 
Causing death by aggravated vehicle taking 
More serious wounding or other act endangering life 
Endangering railway passenger 
LESS SERIOUS OFFENCES: 
Endangering life at sea 
Less serious wounding 
Possession of weapons 
Harassment 
Racially-aggravated Jess serious wounding 
Racially-aggravated harassment 
Cruelty to or neglect of children 
Abandoning a child under the age of 2 yrs 
Child abduction 
Procuring illegal abortion 
Concealment of birth 
Assault on constable 
Common assault 
Racially-aggravated common assault 
From Dodd et al 
86 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
A similar problem occurs with the Sexual Offences category - it includes an extremely 
broad range of crimes. 
SEXUAL OFFENCES: 
Buggery 
Indecent assault on male/female 
Gross indecency between males 
Rape (male and female) 
StaMory rape 
Incest 
Procuration 
Abduction 
Bigamy 
Soliciting 
Abuse of a position of trust 
Gross indecency with a child 
This means that UK crime figures cannot be directly compared with US and SA. 
UK Totals for 2003/04 
Homicide 
Attempted Murder 
More Serious wounding 
Rape (female) 
Indecent assault 
North Wales 
Total violent crime 
Violence agst person 
Sexual offences 
Robbery 
853 
884 
19358 
12354 
26709 
11749 
10979 
569 
201 
(p/1000) 16 
(p/lOOO) 1 
(plOOO) 0 
CALCULATING RATES PER 100 000 FOR THE UK 
Found UK population statistics at National Statistics www.statistics.gov.uk 
Most recent figure for the UK population was for 2003 = 59.6 million. Used this figure 
to work out UK totals for violent crime (only these specific figures provided - N Wales 
figures only given for unusable broad categories). 
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UK Totals for 2003/04 pllOO 000 
Homicide 853 1.43 
Attempted Murder 884 1.48 
More Serious wounding 19358 33 
Rape (female) 12354 21 
Indecent assault 26709 45 
CRIME STATISTICS FOR THE US AND ALABAMA 
Mitchell, M.; Goggins, B.; & Cobert Roberts, C. (2003). 2003 Crime in Alabama. 
Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center. 
http://acjic.alabama.gov/SAC/cia2003.pdf 
Site gives reported crime; operates under FBI standards. 
Violent crime includes homicide, rape, robbery and assault. All have high risk of 
injury/death to the victim. Attempted homicide is listed as assault. Rape includes only 
female rapes; includes attempts. 
Alabama 2003 
(per 100 000) 
Violent crime 413.3 
Homicide 6.6 
Rape 66.7 
Robbery 128.4 
Assault 243.7 
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Tuskegee Crime Statistics and Crime Data 
http://tuskegee.areaconnect.com/crimeI.htm 
Gives Tuskegee figures as proportions per 100 000; and gives national comparison 
figures 
Tuskegee totals for 2002 p/lOO 000 US p/lOO 000 
Homicide 1 8.37 5.6 
Rape 9 75.31 33 
Robberies 30 251.03 145.9 
Assault 43 359.8 310.1 
Figures for 2003 are lower than this; Tuskegee population given on this site as 11846. 
Used this to calculate per 100 000 figures for 2003. 
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APPENDIXB 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Consent form 
This research is aimed at a content analysis of dreams, and a comparison of 
dream events with real life. Should you decide to participate, the 
information you provide will remain confidential. Aside from a consent 
signature, these questionnaires are anonymous. General, overall results of 
content may be published, but individual, identifiable dream accounts will 
not be made public. 
Thinking about one's dreams or some difficult life experiences can be mildly 
distressing to some. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. 
There is no requirement that you participate, nor is there a requirement that 
you have to fill out questions that may be particularly upsetting. 
I consent to participate in this study by completing the attached 
questionnaire about my dreams. 
Signature of consent: ----------------------
Please provide the following demographic information: 
AGE: -----
GENDER: --------
ETHNlCITY: -----------
VERY IMPORTANT DO NOT READ THROUGH TIIE ENTIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE FILLING IT OUT - PLEASE 
ANSWER THE QUESTIONS IN SEQUENCE 
ONL Y GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE ONCE YOU HAVE COMPLETED 
FILLING IN THE CURRENT PAGE 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Your Most Recent Dream: 
What was the date (approx) when you had this dream? 
Please write down the last dream you remember having, whether it was last night, last 
week or last month. Please describe the dream exactly, and as fully as you can 
remember. Your report should contain, whenever possible, a description of the setting 
and people (or animals, objects, etc). If possible, describe your feelings during the 
dream. Tell exactly what happened during the dream, even if it doesn't make sense or 
seems bizarre. Continue on the other side of the page if necessary. 
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Have you ever felt that your life was in danger in real life? Yes/ No 
If so, please describe the incident in as much detail as you can remember 
(If you have felt that your life was in danger on more than one occasion, describe the most 
serious situation) 
[If you need more space, continue on the other side of the page, or use extra paper] 
When did this incident occur? (give an approximate date) 
Have you ever dreamed about this threatening experience? 
How often? (Try to estimate no.oftimes over your lifetime) 
Did the dream( s) occur immediately after the event? 
Yes/No 
If the dreams recurred, how long did you continue dreaming of this event? __ _ 
Do you still dream of it now? __ _ 
If you can, please describe one of these dreams below. (Follow the same instructions as for the 
Most Recent Dream report). 
[If you need more space, continue on the other side of the page, or use extra paper] 
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Try to estimate on average how many potential physical threats/risks (if any) you 
face on a daily basis - how many times do you feel threatened! at risk? 
(Note - we are concerned here with physical rather than psychological/mental or spiritual 
threats. These potential physical threats/risks can include anything - from traffic 
accidents; burning yourself in the kitchen; sports injuries; health problems; occupational 
hazards; etc, to direct physical aggression from other people/animals; crime etc). 
Give your daily estimate __ _ 
Give a weekly estimate 
List the types of physical threats you encounter regularly 
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Have you ever had an overwhelmingly positive or exhilarating experience in real 
life? [Eg: Swimming/diving in the ocean~ getting married, a helicopter ride it can be 
anything that you felt really excitedlhappy/exhilarated by] 
If you answered yes, please describe this event in detail 
When did this incident occur? (give an approximate date) 
Have you ever dreamed about this experience? Yes! No 
How often? (Try to estimate no.oftimes over your lifetime) 
Did the dream(s) occur immediately after the event? 
YeslNo 
If the dreams recurred, how long did you continue dreaming of this event? __ _ 
Do you still dream of it now? __ _ 
If you can, please describe one of these dreams below. (Follow the same instructions as for the 
Most Recent Dream report). 
[If you need more space, continue on the other side of the page, or use extra paper] 
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APPENDIXC 
RATING SHEET AND GUIDELINES 
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RATING SHEET 
MOST RECENT DREAM RATING 
Does the dream contain a realistic physical threat to the dreamer? 
If the answer is YES, answer the following questions: 
Is this threat life-threatening? 
Does the dreamer escape the threat? 
Is the escape realistic? 
Would you classifY the threat as 
A: Modem 
B: Ancestral 
REAL LIFE THREAT RATING 
YesINo 
YesINo 
YesINo 
A 
Into which of the following categories does the reported threat fall? 
YesINo 
B 
1: Immediate real possibility of death or severe hann~ did the person have reason to believe they 
could be killed or severly harmed? 
2: Report simply of a vague, indefinite threat 
3: No description of the reported threat 
4: The description indicates no external threat to the dreamer. 1 2 3 4 
Would you classifY the threat as 
A: Modem 
B: Ancestral 
REAL LIFE THREAT DREAMS 
1: Does the dreamer escape the threat? 
2: Is the escape realistic? 
REAL LIFE POSITIVE EVENT DREAMS 
Is the dream content 
A: positive 
B: negative 
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RATING GUIDELINES 
RATING THREATS IN THE MRD REPORT 
NNB: All threats rated must affect the dreamer, not other characters in the dream 
So watching something threatening happening to a friend etc does not count, unless the dreamer 
is directly threatened as well. 
We are looking for realistic threats - something that could happen objectively in real 
life 
We are looking for physical threats - not subjective sense of being threatened in other 
ways 
The car nearly went over the cliff = a physical threat 
'I felt really uncomfortable in that room' = not a physical threat 
EGS OF REAI.ISTIC THREATS 
He was trying to hit me with a spade 
Stepfather hits with stick; then stabs with knife 
Enemies chasing with intent to harm or kill (some dream chases are not this cfear-cut - use your 
judgment as to whether there is a physical threat present or not) 
EG Dream where enemies want to kill dreamer but they manifest as a small furry animal chasing 
her through a forest -the overall scenario is clearly not realistic. 
EGS OF UNREALISTIC THREATS 
The witch was putting a curse on me 
The house was trying to kill me 
Jumping over giant waves 
AMBIGUOUS CASES 
A dream where there is a boy locked inside a piano - when the dreamer sits at the piano 
the barrel of a gun emerges and the boy teaches her to playa tune with the threat of 
being shot if she fails 
Being threatened with a gun is realistic enough, but the other elements - the boy locked in the 
piano, and the threat of death for playing poorly - are not realistic. On balance, it seems that this 
is not something that is likely to occur in real life, so it should not be coded as a realistic physical 
threat. Some dreams will present difficult decisions - reason through it as best you can. 
Life Threatening MRD threats 
Its usually simple to decide if the realistic physical threat is in fact life-threatening or not. 
ESCAPES: 
To code an escape, there must be a description of it in the dream report. Waking up does not 
constitute an escape from a dream threat. 
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To decide whether the escape is realistic or not, decide whether the escape tactic would work in 
real life. 
Egs of realistic escapes: hiding; shooting the bad guy; successfully running away 
Egs of unrealistic escapes: flying away; putting stones in a certain pattern to deter pursuers; 
turning into something or someone else. 
The MRD threats then need to be coded as either modern or ancestral 
types: 
Modem threats: 
Anything that couldn't possibly have occurred in our evolutionary history 
EG: Surgery; traffic accidents; plane accidents or emergency landings; incidents involving 
explosives; Car-jacking; 
Ancestral threats: 
Anything that has been occurring since the dawn of time 
EG: Assault; rape; mugging; attacks with weapons of any sort 
Being shot at is coded as ancestral because threats of guns are extensions 
of threats with any weapon e.g. bow and arrow/spear 
RATING THREATS IN REAL LIFE: 
Again we are looking for real physical threats. 
Category 1: Actuallife-tbreatening event 
EGS: being shot at; being attacked; being raped; being robbed at gun or knifepoint; being 
threatened by gangsters; finding armed burglars in your house 
Category 2: Vague or indefinite threat (i.e. not immediately threatening the respondent) 
Being home alone at night and fearing break-ins; walking alone in deserted/dangerous areas; 
being only woman in almost empty taxi or train; etc; 
Category 3: No description 
Person says has been threatened but doesn't describe event 
Category 4: No physical threat present in description 
Any reports of attempted suicide/suicidal thoughts go here; also reports of purely subjective 
distress - feelings of being threatened that have no reference to actual physical dangers. 
EG: My boyfriend dumping me 
The threats then need to be coded as either modern or ancestral types: 
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Modem threats: 
Anything that couldn't possibly have occurred in our evolutionary history 
EG: Surgery; traffic accidents; plane accidents or emergency landings; incidents involving 
explosives; Car-jacking; 
Ancestral threats: 
Anything that has been occurring since the dawn of time 
EG: Assault; rape; mugging; attacks with weapons of any sort 
Being shot at is coded as ancestral because threats of guns are simply extensions 
of threats with any weapon e.g. bow and arrow 
Real life threat dreams: 
Please code escapes as you did for the MRD reports: 
Ie there must be a description of the escape; or a clear statement of evading the threat; 
and the decision as to whether the escape was realistic depends on whether it would be effective 
in waking life. 
Real life positive dreams: 
You need to decide whether the content is positive or negative if a dream is provided. 
Positive content: the described dream contains only positive elements; it clearly reproduces the 
positive real life experience described above 
Negative content: the described dream reproduces the positive event described above, but there 
are anxieties or fears described in relation to it; something goes wrong; the dream ends badly; etc 
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